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January's "Aube"

The aube, or dawn-song, must have occupied a familiar and somehow significant place in Chaucer's cultural repertory. The extended example included in *Troilus and Criseyde* (III, 1422-1526, 1702-8) has long been recognized; and in a recent article¹ I believe I have shown satisfactorily the existence of an aube-parody in the *Reeve's Tale*, centered in the farewell speeches of Aleyn and Malyne (4234-48). This evidence for Chaucer's consciousness of the aube as a poetic form places us on firmer ground in examining the comparatively slight hints—probably inconclusive in themselves—that make up the following example.

In the *Merchant's Tale*, the psychological and moral debauch of January's wedding-night (1795-1854) is framed by a pair of commonplaces related to traditional aube, both attributed to January himself. The first is his wish

. . . that the nyght wolde lasten everemo. (IV, 1763)²

The theme is ancient and no doubt inevitable; but it does seem in a

¹"An Aube in the *Reeve's Tale*," *ELH*, xxvi (1959), 295-310. Some of the information on the aube included in this study may be helpful as a general introduction to the present article.

²Quotations are from F. N. Robinson (ed.), *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer* (2nd ed.; Boston, 1957).

special way characteristic of the aube.³ To notice a very few examples, in Guiraut de Bornelh's *alba* "Reis glorios" the lover announces,

Bel dos companh, tan soi en ric soïorn
qu'eu no volgra mais fos alba ni iorn. . . .⁴

In the "Gaite de la tor" he wishes more circumstantially,

Se salve l'onor
au criator
estoit, tot tens voudroie,
nuit fëist del jor;
ja mais dolor
ne pesance n'avroie.⁵

Chaucer's Criseyde complains,

O nyght, allas! why nyltow over us hove,
As long as whan Almena lay by Jove? (III, 1427-8)

January's pitiful revel is followed by his speech containing the line,

Now day is come, I may no lenger wake. (1856)

This acknowledgement—mildly comic in itself within the venerable tradition of the wedding-joke, but certainly soured by its context here—may seem on the face of it to have only the faintest resemblance to anything in the aube. The connection, I believe, is supplied by a line of Aleyn's farewell to Malyne in the aube-parody of the *Reeve's Tale*:

The day is come, I may no lenger byde. (4237)

The parodic quality of this line seems to me beyond reasonable doubt.⁶ If this is so, it is difficult to imagine Chaucer's writing our quite similar line, in so apt a situation of the ironic *Merchant's Tale*, without conscious reference to the aube. And if this reference is a conscious one, it is almost as difficult to suppose that the placing of our

³ Noted by Robinson, p. 715. In addition to the examples following, see especially the "En un vergier," l. 5, ed. Carl Appel, *Provençalische Chrestomathie* (6th ed.; Leipzig, 1930), p. 90; the "Us cavaliers," str. 2, *ibid.*, p. 91; the "Entre moi et mon ami," ll. 18-20, ed. Karl Bartsch, *Altfranzösische Romanzen und Pastourellen* (Leipzig, 1870), p. 28; the motet-aube "L'abe c'apeirt au jor," ll. 8-9, ed. Gaston Raynaud, *Recueil de motets français des XII^e et XIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1884), II, 5; and for a list of such sentiments in the German *Tagelieder*, Walter De Gruyter, *Das deutsche Tagelied* (Diss., Leipzig, 1887), pp. 35, 63, 107.

⁴ Ll. 31-2, Appel, p. 92.

⁵ Ll. 67-72, ed. Karl Bartsch and Leo Wiese, *Chrestomathie de l'ancien français* (12th ed.; Leipzig, 1920), p. 168.

⁶ "Aube in the *Reeve's Tale*," pp. 298-9.

two lines in the *Merchant's Tale*—roughly, one on either side of January's wedding-night—is no more than accident.

I take this skeleton-aube as one more device employed by Chaucer to point up the bitterly comic incongruities in January's marriage. Though the union of January and May has been duly "solemnized"—in context, almost unbearably so (1700-9, 1729-41)—its motivation is the same concupiscence which in Christian terms necessarily forms the core of the unsanctified lovemaking in the aube. But even according to the flesh, January's night of high romance (1818-54) shows up badly by comparison with the aube-world of erotic beauty which presumably he is trying to create; as in so many other respects, he has his eye on an inadequate ideal and still falls short of it. Toward this effect, both of his aube lines are ironically distorted. The first, his wish for endless night, is wrenched from its usual and much more natural position as part of a lament over the breaking of day and the swiftness of the night's joys, into a cry of anticipation—apparently an insight into the boundless prurience of January's imagination and its pathetic contrast with the realities. The ironic inversion of his second aube line (1856), besides providing its own comment on the folly of the first, contrasts cruelly with the usual situation in the aube, where the lover, still ardent, abandons the delights of his lady reluctantly with the coming of dawn.⁷

And perhaps there is one general observation worth making. In courtly aube, this unwilling departure of the lover is normally surrounded by a tone of somber heroism in the face of a climactic and really formidable separation:

Sie beide luste daz er kuste si genuoc:
gevuochet wart dem tage.
urloup er nam, daz dô wol zam; nu merket wie:
da ergienc ein schimpf bi clage.
si heten beide sich bewegen,
ezn wart sô nâhe nie gelegen,
des noch diu minne hât den pris:
obe der sunnen drî mit blicke wâren,
si enmôhten zwischen si geliuhten.
er sprach 'nu wil ich rîten.
dîn wîplich gûete neme mîn war,
und si mîn schilt hiut hin und her, und her nâch ze allen zîten.' *

⁷ Ibid., p. 305.

* Wolfram von Eschenbach, "Ez ist nu tac," ed. Karl Lachmann, rev. Eduard Hartl (Berlin, 1952), I, 8, ll. 21-32. See also the last three strophes of the "Us cavaliers," Appel, p. 91; the conclusion of the "Un petit devant

The idea seems to have tickled Chaucer's sense of reality, inviting comparison with the limitations of flesh and blood as we know them, and with the unheroic and anticlimactic grain of most human life. At any rate, he does not easily tire of supplying the realistic counterpoint:

"Now day is come, I may no lenger wake."

And doun he leyde his heed, and sleep til pryme. (*MchT*, 1856-7)

Aleyn wax very in the dawenyngge,
For he had swonken al the longe nyght. . . . (*RvT*, 4234-5)

Retorned to his real paleys soone,
He softe into his bed gan for to slynke,
To slepe longe, as he was wont to doone. . . . (*TC*, III, 1534-6)^o

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R. E. KASKE

Simkin's Camus Nose: A Latin Pun in the *Reeve's Tale*?

Recent scholarship has called attention to several instances of rhetorical word-play in Chaucer's "Reeve's Tale."¹ An additional example in the same tale appears, however, to have escaped detection. Does not Chaucer's emphasis on Simkin's *camus nose*² involve a Latin pun? As the Latin adjective for "camus" (i. e. "flat-nosed" or "snub-nosed") is *simus*,³ it is altogether fitting that a snub-nosed person should be called Simond. Such word-play on name and

le jor," Bartsch-Wiese, *Chrestomathie*, p. 220; the "Friuntlichen lac" of Walther von der Vogelweide, ed. Carl von Kraus (11th ed.; Berlin, 1950), pp. 123-6; Wolfram's "Den morgenblic," Lachmann-Hartl, pp. 4-5; and in a general way almost any of the courtly *tagelieder*, a convenient selection of which are ed. Ernst Scheunemann and Friedrich Ranke, *Texte zur Geschichte des deutschen Tageliedes* (Altdeutsche Übungstexte, VI; Bern, 1947).

^o Paralleled in *Filostrato*, III, 53, and *Livre de Troilus*, ed. L. Moland and C. d'Héricault, *Nouvelles françaises en prose du XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1858), p. 187; but Chaucer's slight changes seem to me to produce a quite different emphasis.

¹ Norman E. Eliason, "Some Word-Play in Chaucer's Reeve's Tale," *MLN*, LXXI (1956), 162-4; see also Helge Kökeritz, "Rhetorical Word-Play in Chaucer," *PMLA*, LXIX (1954), 937-52.

² For the miller's *camus* note as an index of his character, see Walter Clyde Curry, "Chaucer's Reeve and Miller," *PMLA*, xxxv (1920), 189-209; and Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences (New York, 1926), pp. 71-90.

³ Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, 1900), s. v. *simus*.

physiognomy could be supported both by Pliny's *Natural History* and by medieval rhetorical theory.

Because of their snub-noses, Pliny declared, certain animals have sometimes received such names as Simo ("Snubby") and Silo ("Pug"):

Intra eas hilaritatem risumque indicantes buccae et altior homini tantum quem novi mores subdoliae inrisioni dicavere, nasus, non alii animalium nares eminent: avibus, serpentibus, piscibus foramina tantum ad olfactus sine nariibus; et hinc cognomina Simorum, Silonum.⁴

Hence dolphins prefer the name Simo ("Snubnose"):

... pro voce gemitus humano similis, dorsum repandum, rostrum simum: qua de causa nomen simonis omnes miro modo agnoscunt maluntque ita appellari.⁵

Medieval rhetoric and poetics, furthermore, placed *nomen* at the head of the list of eleven *attributa personae*⁶ derived from Cicero.⁷ "Argumentum sive locus a nomine," according to Matthieu de Vendôme's *Ars Versificatoria* (I, #78), "est quando per interpretationem nominis de persona aliquid boni vel mali persuadetur. . . ."⁸ Medieval rhetoricians were also familiar with the species of *interpretatio* known as *notatio*,⁹ which consisted primarily in exploiting the etymology¹⁰ of a name. This device was particularly prominent in the

⁴ Pliny, *Natural History*, III, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1940), 530.

⁵ Ibid., 178.

⁶ Matthieu de Vendôme, *Ars Versificatoria*, I, #77: "Sunt igitur attributa personae undecim: nomen, natura, convictus, fortuna, habitus, studium, affectio, consilium, casus, facta, orationes." Edmond Faral, *Les Arts Poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e Siècle* (Paris, 1924), p. 136. Cf. the views of Radbert, *ibid.*, p. 79.

⁷ Cicero, *De Inventione*, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1949), p. 70.

⁸ Faral, p. 136. Matthieu cites the following example (136):

"Caesar ab effectu nomen tenet, omnia caedens
Nominis exponit significata manus."

Cf. *Ars Versificatoria*, I, #76: "Siquidem hic aliter accipienda sunt nomina ista 'argumentum' sive 'locus a nomine vel a natura' quam in logica facultate. Hic enim nihil aliud est argumentum, sive locus a nomine vel a natura, nisi per interpretationem nominis et per naturales proprietates de persona aliquid probare vel improbare, personam propriare vel impropriare." *Ibid.*, 136.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹⁰ Cf. Cicero, *Topics*, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1949), p. 409: "Many arguments are derived from *notatio* (etymology). This is what is used when an argument is developed out of the meaning of a word." John of Garland's *Poetria* (ed. Giovanni Mari), *Romanische Forschungen*, XIII (1902), 883-965, gives the following example of this type of argument (892): "In ethimologiis locum habemus inveniendi: ut si aliquis intendat laudare dominum papam, dicat: *vere dominus papa piissimus pater*; dicitur *pater patrum*, quod ipsius

Latin elegiac comedies, such as *Aulularia*, *Baucis*, *Alda*, *Paulinus et Polla*.¹¹ Although Chaucer does not employ this figure in the conventional manner, with an explicit etymological analysis of the character's name, he provides nonetheless a subtler "interpretation" of Simond's name by describing his *simus nose*.¹²

Whether his point of departure was specifically the miller's name or his physiognomy need not concern us. Chaucer could equally well have given him a name indicative of his most characteristic feature, or a face suggestive of his name.

In addition to his *camus nose*, Simkin shares several other characteristics with classical *personae* of similar names. They deserve mention, though it is impossible to prove that they influenced Chaucer's portrait.

First, Simkin's activities as a miller are roughly paralleled by those of Simylus¹³ in the *Moretum*. In this brief epyllion, which the Middle Ages ascribed to Virgil,¹⁴ the poet devotes several lines¹⁵ to an account of how the "exigui cultor . . . rusticus agri" grinds his own corn at his mill in preparation for his morning repast. Unlike Simond, however, he is not a professional miller.

Secondly, Simkin's only daughter is violated. In Terence's *Adelphoe*, Simulus is described as the father of a maiden seduced by Demea's son:

nominis ethimologica expositio manifestat, et dicitur a *pape* grece, quod est 'admirabile' latine; unde papa sacerdos admirabilis, quod in eo ex prerogativa vite et scientie declaratur." Cf. Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, Book V, *De Rhetorica*: "a nota vel etymologia, ut Graeci dicunt, sumimus argumentum, (ut) 'si consul est, quid consulit rei publicae, quid aliud Tullius facit, cum affecit supplicio coniuratos?' quo in loco originem vocabuli tantum oportet attendere." *Martianus Capella*, ed. Adolfus Dick (Lipsiae, 1925), pp. 239-40.

¹¹ Faral, p. 66.

¹² In this reference Chaucer seems to be combining the *argumentum a nomine* and the *argumentum a natura*. For description of the dual aspect of man's nature—physical and moral—see Faral, pp. 78, 80. The allusion to Simkin's *camus nose* is not merely relevant to his physical nature, but indirectly indicative of his moral disposition. It is also suggestive of his name. See Curry, *passim*.

¹³ Both names are diminutives—Simkin's of *Simond* (see Walter W. Skeat, *Notes to the Canterbury Tales* [Oxford, 1894], p. 118); Simylus' of *Simos*. See H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1901), s. v. *Σίμος*: "Σίμος . . . masc. prop. n. *Flat-nose*. . . Σίμωνος is a dim. form." The name *Simulus* occurs as a variant reading in at least one manuscript of the *Moretum* (*Appendix Vergiliana*, ed. R. Ellis [Oxonii, 1950]); cf. Lewis and Short, "simulus . . . , dim. adj. [simus], *flat-nosed*, *pug-nosed*. . ."

¹⁴ See *Virgil*, II, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1946), 530-1.

¹⁵ Lines 19-30.

Hegio nostrum amicum noras Simulum
aequalem?
Demca quid ni?
Hegio filiam eius virginem
vitiavit.¹⁶

Thirdly, though attempting to outwit others, Simond is himself the butt of a trick. Horace's *Ars Poetica* refers to "shameless Pithias, who has won a talent by bamboozling Simo":¹⁷

. . . audax
Pythias, emuncto lucrata Simone talentum.

In Terence's *Andria*, Simo *Senex* attempts to outwit his son Pamphilus and Davus the slave, yet is eventually outwitted by Davus.¹⁸

In a French *fabliau*¹⁹ recounting essentially the same story as Chaucer's, the miller remains nameless. While it is possible that Chaucer himself contributed both the name Simond (or Simkin) and his camus nose, it is also conceivable that he may have derived one or both of these details from some unknown source, possibly a Latin *comoedia*. The word-play on Simond and *simus* (or Simkin and *simulus*) would obviously be more effective in Latin than in English, and it is by no means improbable that the miller's literary ancestry may have included a snub-nosed character called Simo or Simulus. Though translation into the vernacular would have obscured the original pun, the detail of the camus nose remained, and the anglicized personal name still bore a recognizable resemblance to the Latin name.

Names derived from classical comedy, moreover, were not unusual in medieval *comoediae* (e. g., Querulus in *Aulularia*, Davus in *Baucis*), and they were not infrequently subjected to the etymological analysis known as *notatio*. Davus, for example, interprets his name as *dans vana*, and Querulus explains his own:

Natus ego, ut *quererer* semper, *Querulusque* vocatus,
Ut vivam *querulus* et mea fata *querar*. . . .²⁰

By the same rhetorical device a character called Simo or Simulus

¹⁶ Terence, II, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1912), 264.

¹⁷ Horace, *Ars Poetica*, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1947), pp. 470-1.

¹⁸ Terence, I, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1912). Cf. Act I, line 203: "ubivis facilius passus sim quam in hac re me deludior." Simo *Senex* also appears as a character in Plautus' *Mostellaria* and *Pseudolus*, but these were among the twelve Plautine plays "lost" until the fifteenth century.

¹⁹ W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster (eds.), *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales* (Chicago, 1941), pp. 126-47.

²⁰ Faral, p. 66.

would naturally explain his name in terms of his *simus* nose. By introducing *notatio* and the *argumentum a nomine* into his *fabliau*, Chaucer was employing a device already well-developed in an allied genre.²¹

Atlanta

JOHN M. STEADMAN

Marvell's "Coy Mistress" and Desperate Lover

It is one of the many ironies of literary history that Andrew Marvell is best known for his impassioned argument against the coyness of a mistress; for almost all of his other love poems express a fear that sexuality will destroy the spiritual qualities of love. In "The Unfortunate Lover," for example, the destructive power of passion is compared unfavorably with innocent love (lines 1-4); and we can see the same preference for innocent love in "The Nymph complaining for the Death of her Faun." To come to Marvell's better known poems: "The Definition of Love" closes with a "conjunction of the mind"—not of the bodies. The latter sections of "Upon Appleton House" emphasize that complete withdrawal from all human relationships which reaches its culmination in "The Garden."

Two paradises t'were in one,
To live in paradise alone.

We should not, therefore, be too surprised to find some evidence of this oft-repeated fear of sexuality in any of Marvell's poems.

Before turning to the text of "To His Coy Mistress," we must bear in mind the Platonic concept (familiar to all readers of seventeenth century poetry) that when the lover leaves the body for the soul, he leaves the world of time for the realm of eternity. The world of time involves change, motions, and, consequently, corruption and death; eternity knows neither motion nor change. These ideas pervade the first section of the poem, and make the opening lines particularly significant: "Had we but World enough and Time / This coyness, lady, were no crime." To have so much time that one can allow a

²¹ In Raby's opinion, the vernacular *fabliau* was essentially the "true successor" of the Latin *comœdia*, and in their subject matter—amorous intrigues and obscenity—the two genres were closely allied. See F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, II (Oxford, 1934), 54-5.

thousand years to pass without any change in one's mistress is to get beyond time altogether. Of course, in such a realm, the sensible objects like the lady's "eye," "forehead" and "breast" would not exist. And it is this juxtaposition of the eternal and the sensible that brings about the absurdity of spending two hundred years "to adore each Breast." But by creating a world where the physical aspects of love are free from the destruction of time, the poet is doing more than being absurd. Beneath the bantering mockery of this first section is a genuine regret that love cannot escape the destructive power of time; it is not only the lady who "deserves," but the poet who desires "this State."

That the poet is more fearful of time than he is of the lady's coyness is made explicit in the second section: "But at my back I alwaies hear / Time's winged charriot hurrying near." The humor and the bantering tone are gone. Here, in the real world, eternity does not preserve the physical objects from destruction, but is associated with an unknown blankness ("Desarts") on the other side of the grave. Consequently, the physical aspects of love are seen in dissolution. The darkness that is suggested by such words as "worms," "dust," "ashes" and "grave" is in sharp contrast to the brightness of the "long Loves day" in the first section.

Why then, in the face of this horrible description of the physical world, is the poet so insistent, in the final section, on a physical union? The obvious answer is that by means of this union the lovers will "at once" their "Time devour." But how can the lovers "devour" time when they seem to be hastening to their own destruction "Thorough the Iron gates of Life"? One critic has attempted to solve this dilemma by linking the "Sun" in the final couplet with "Time's winged Charriot"; and, he continues, ". . . Although we cannot stop the chariot, we can avoid hearing its relentless succession by getting on it and going for a wild ride (like Phaeton's)."¹ Another critic interprets the sun, "setting only to rise again," as "the symbol of perpetual self-renewal, in contrast with human life, which sets once and forever. . . ."²

But these lines and the entire stanza can be understood more easily by remembering the Platonic conception that time is created by the motions of the heavenly spheres: "The Sun itselfe, which makes times . . .," a line from Donne's "The Anniversary," is a typical

¹ Frederick L. Gwynne, *The Explicator*, XI (May 1953).

² Laurence Sasek, *The Explicator*, XIV (April 1956).

example of this concept. Since Marvell's lovers are making their own time, the "Ball" into which they have rolled their "Strength" and "sweetness" has now been transformed into a "Sun." For, if the heavenly spheres create time by their movements, that which moves and creates time (according to the poet's wit—if not according to logic) must be a heavenly sphere. Hence the lovers' "Ball" becomes "our Sun."

But why should this sun "run"? In some poems the answer would be obvious: the faster the sun runs the sooner the lovers can enjoy night. In Spenser's *Epithalamion*, for example, the declining sun cannot move quickly enough for the impassioned lover. Marvell's "Sun" also brings about a union of the lovers. But how different is the tone!

Let us roll all our Strength, and all
Our sweetness, up into one Ball:
And tear our Pleasures with rough strife,
Thorough the Iron gates of Life.
Thus, though we cannot make our Sun
Stand still, yet we will make him run.

To go "thorough" the gates can mean to leave life as well as to enter, and since they are "iron" gates, the first meaning is the more probable. The intensity of the physical union, therefore, leads to death—in both senses of the word. But here there is little of the ecstasy that is traditionally associated with a *morte raptus*. The syntax of the lines indicate that the "Strength" and "sweetness" of the lovers is not intensified by the physical union, but destroyed. And the imagery—"birds of prey," "strife," and "Iron Gates" also suggest that the ecstasy which leads the lovers out of this world, into a "World enough, and time," leads them into death. What Donne once said of the circle can be applied to the "Ball" created by the lovers: ". . . in this circle the two points meet, the womb and the grave are but one point. . . ." ²

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² *LXXX Sermons* (London, 1640), p. 268.

Speculations on the Dating of the Trinity MS. of Milton's Poems

The transcription of *Comus* in the important Trinity MS. of John Milton's minor poems (edited in facsimile by William Aldis Wright in 1899) gives handwriting evidence of revision to the published version during late 1637.¹ But examination of the basic transcription of the mask uncovers two additional occurrences of the Italian "e": "scene," second "e," and "towne," both in a direction between lines 957 and 958. Definite dating cannot be established for such incidental uses because Milton wrote an Italian "e" in his signature for the bachelor's degree in the University Subscriptions Book at Christ College, January 1629,² although the usual belief has been that he began to use this letter formation in late 1637 shortly before his sojourn abroad. However, since the revised sections of the mask seem to date from late 1637 and since there seems to be no definite evidence that Milton used the Italian "e" between 1629 and 1637,³ the importance of the Trinity MS. requires that it be examined in light of the possibility that the basic transcription of *Comus* may have been made later than has previously been believed. Although only speculative conclusions can be reached, the significance to Milton's biography and literary achievements justifies their formulation.

The following facts concerning the materials lying before the transcription of *Comus* in the manuscript are patent: *Arcades* is a corrected copy. Draft one of *At a Solemn Music* had been partially worked out in Milton's mind before being put down and revised; draft two is a further corrected redaction; draft three revises lines 17-28; and draft four was written down as the final form sometime later. The first draft of the letter to an unknown friend, to which is appended a clean copy of Sonnet 7, was composed at writing and corrected, the second draft being a revised and augmented version. *On Time* and *Upon the Circumcision* are both clean copies in the same cramped hand as

¹ See the remarks of Helen Darbishire in *Seventeenth-Century News* (Winter 1953), Supplement.

² Reproduced in Samuel Leigh Sotheby, *Ramblings in the Elucidation of the Autograph of Milton* (London, 1861), facing p. 124.

³ Occurrences in such marginalia as those found in Milton's own copies of Varchi, Pindar, Aratus, etc., have generally been dated 1638 or later. *Lycidas*, penned in November 1637, shows only two uses of the Italian "e" in the original transcription ("hence," 18, and "greene," 140, but this last is questionable) and three in reworked material ("selfe," 58, and "whome" and "nature," 60).

draft four of *At a Solemn Music*.⁴ *Arcades*, the first three drafts of *At a Solemn Music*, and the two drafts of the letter are in a hand which is usually freer, more hurried, and more careless than that of *At a Solemn Music*, draft four, *On Time*, and *Upon the Circumcision*, which hand is more similar to that at the beginning of *Comus*. The reason for the freer, more hurried, and more careless hand is that Milton was doing some composing while he wrote, as can be seen from the cleaner, steadier, more even hand when he was merely copying Sonnet 7 just after having composed the letter. It would seem, therefore, that, partially on the basis of handwriting, of the material lying before *Comus* in the Trinity MS., *At a Solemn Music*, draft four, *On Time*, and *Upon the Circumcision* were put down latest; that prior to that and about the same time, Milton transcribed *Arcades* and composed *At a Solemn Music* and the letter; and that prior to that time, he had written Sonnet 7 and *Arcades*, and apparently also *On Time* and *Upon the Circumcision*. If he had written the latter two poems after having composed *At a Solemn Music* traces of composition should be found in the manuscript and the poems would probably not precede *At a Solemn Music* in the printed editions.

On September 23, 1637,⁵ Milton wrote to Charles Diodati, "You ask what I am thinking of? So may the good Deity help me, of Immortality! But what am I doing? I am pluming my wings and meditating flight; but as yet our Pegasus raises himself on very tender pinions" (trans. Masson); soon afterwards he reworked *Comus*, wrote *Lycidas*, allowed both to be published, and prepared to go to Italy for further study and experience. After his mother's death in April Milton was frequently in London and even contemplated taking up residence there. Although it has been assumed that Milton did not take up residence in London, there is no proof for such an assumption. Indeed, after having mentioned his studious life at his father's estate,

⁴ The three sonnets on p. 9 and certain corrections and additions in *Arcades*, *At a Solemn Music* (draft four), *On Time*, and *Upon the Circumcision* were, of course, written after 1640.

⁵ W. Arthur and Alberta Turner suggest in the *Complete Prose Works of John Milton* (Yale University Press, 1953), p. 325, n. 6, that Milton's two letters to Diodati should be dated November. If they are right, the argument here advanced is reinforced. Some amount of poetic work should have been accomplished before he hurried to see Diodati, "in the beginning of the autumn," as he says in the first letter, and the dating of the revision of *Comus* in late 1637 would be even more cogent. Likewise, his remarks in the second letter coincide with the central theme of *Lycidas*. If these letters were written in November, the conclusions in this paper perhaps should be advanced about a month or two.

he remarked in *Defensio Secunda*, "In this manner I spent five years till my mother's death," which might suggest change not only in residence but also in activity, although he goes on to discuss his visit to other lands which took place *six* years after his graduation from Cambridge. Whether or not there was an actual change of residence, which might have enhanced literary activity, his work on *Comus* and *Lycidas* indicates renewed creativity during the autumn of 1637 and the winter of 1637-1638.

Is it possible that all the material of the Trinity MS. was recorded in it from 1637 onward, rather than from around 1633, which date would seem to indicate the manuscript's lying untouched for three or four years? (If this material were put down before 1634 and if the *Comus* transcription dates around 1637, Milton must have used a separate manuscript in the interim to record his own copy of *Comus*.) To me it seems more probable that he started to use the manuscript in 1637 when he was envisioning poetic achievements and immortality, continuing to use it for almost all other poetic work except the Latin poems, the translations from the psalms and Horace, and the three major poems (although rudimentary outlines occur).

The reason for dating the manuscript from 1633 is that Sonnet 7 was written in December 1632 and the letter to an unknown friend refers to it as "my nightward thoughts some while since"; feeling that the letter could not have been written much later than the sonnet and that *Arcades*, which precedes it in the manuscript, must have been written before *Comus*, first produced in 1634, commentators have generally assigned a date around 1633 to the entertainment and thus to the manuscript. However, *Arcades*, certainly composed before *Comus*, is merely a copy in the manuscript.⁶ If the suggestion above is correct, Milton's intent in transcribing *Arcades* in 1637, a period marked by renewed aspirations and creativity, would have been to perfect it as seen in such instances as the beginning, which is changed; the substitution of lines 10 and 11 for two other lines after line 9; the corrections in lines 12, 13, 18, 23, 24, 41, 44, 45, 50, 59, and 62; the deletion of a line after line 45; and the addition of lines 106 and 107. In like manner, he revised *Comus* in an attempt to sublimate what Professor Tillyard calls the high and solemn themes of an

⁶ See the present author's "The Manuscript of *Arcades*," *Notes and Queries* (October, 1959), for discussion of the possibility that the transcription into the Trinity MS. occurred after the original performance of this entertainment.

otherwise academic dispute. But the dating of *At a Solemn Music* and the letter to an unknown friend would have to be revised.

At a Solemn Music causes no trouble, for the only evidence to date it has been its position in the manuscript and its relationship to *On Time* and *Upon the Circumcision*. If *At a Solemn Music* was written in 1637, *On Time* and *Upon the Circumcision* may still be dated earlier, although the metrics which all three exhibit would seem to proffer close dating. (*Upon the Circumcision*, of course, need not have been written on or even close to January 1.) Were these two poems devised shortly before Milton picked up the Trinity MS. and then recorded along with their newly finished companion piece in order to have final, clean copies? The experimentation which these poems embody is surely congruous with his renewed hopes and poetic activity and, as has so often been observed, it finds efflorescence in *Lycidas*, written c. November 1637.

In September 1637 what constituted the tender pinions of Pegasus which Milton referred to in his second letter to Diodati? Is the expression merely figurative for unpreparedness in poetic matters or does it also signify actual poetry which was not totally auspicious? If the latter, poems written some years back should not have been thought of here as the tone suggests current materials, and anyway Diodati would have known about them. *Lycidas* was written a little later, and, in addition, does not satisfy this remark. *Ad Patrem*, if written shortly before, is too personal for inclusion as a poem composed with an eye to immortality. The redaction of *Comus* at this time would have been part of the allusion, as would *Arcades*, if the speculations in this paper are sound. Yet it seems to me that Milton was talking of poems less considerable and more truly of recent provenience when referring to pluming his wings with tender pinions. The three very original English odes would, in their experimentation, their high endeavors, their partial successfulness, and their broadly representative poetic subjects, embrace all that Milton implies by the phrase in this section of the letter. Therefore, if this reading is correct, it is plausible to suggest their authorship not long before September 1637.

The expression in both drafts of the letter, "my nightward thoughts some while since," which is applied to Sonnet 7, can be variously interpreted. There is nothing in it which precludes a five-year lapse of time (from 1632 when he wrote Sonnet 7 to 1637). The poem says just what Milton wants to say to his friend: he too has wondered

about his lack of accomplishment. In draft two is a sentence which indicates appreciable time: "whether it proceed from a principle bad, good, or naturall *it could not have held out thus long* against so strong opposition" (my italics). As the years at Cambridge (1625-1632) cannot be counted here, one and a half years or so (in 1633 or 1634, that is) seem too short to make such an assertion as "held out thus long."

Though they may be futural, there are two other statements which ordinarily would indicate past action: "But if you thinke, as you said, that too much love of learning is in fault, & that *I have given up my selfe to dreame away my yeares* in the armes of *studious retirement*" and "there is . . . another act . . . available to dissuade *prolonged* obscurity" (my italics). These sentences may be interpreted to mean that at the time that he wrote Milton had given indications of continuing as he was, so that after some future period he would have passed years in studious retirement, thus making his obscurity prolonged then. On the other hand, they may be interpreted to mean that he had well in the past given himself up to years of studious retirement, making his obscurity already prolonged at writing. This has, I believe, been the usual interpretation of the phrases. If these phrases are preteritive, then less than two years would not be called "yeares," "given up" and "retirement" would hardly be consonant with such a short interval, and his brief obscurity (in 1633 or 1634) would not have been labelled "prolonged." For Milton to say this antecedently, it would have been necessary that more time elapse than could have by the end of 1633, as his friend would not have considered the years spent at college preparing for a clerical life as dreaming away time.

The subject of the letter—his belatedness—had apparently often been broached by the unknown friend, for Milton asserts, "you are often to me . . . as a good watchman to admonish that the howres of night passe on. . . ." "I therfore thinke my selfe bound though unask't," he continues, "to give you account, *as oft as occasion is*, of this my tardie moving" (my italics). This new occasion had arisen because Milton and his friend had met the day before he wrote; "yet *now* I will not streine for any set apologie . . ." (my italics). In the past, it may be inferred, he answered his friend's admonishments with prescribed defenses; now he refers himself instead to what his mind "shall have at any tyme to declare her selfe at her best ease"—a result, perhaps, of his having come to a decision about his

life. No longer will he seek defense (note the substitution in the second draft, line 39, of "excuse" for "would defend") for his inactivity: he is resolved to be fit to accomplish his endeavors, regardless of such pressures and "strong opposition" as he enumerates. His correspondent should "well repent of having made mention at all of this matter. . . ."

If the burden of this letter was previously "often" discussed, it seems likely—again—that a longer time than from July 1632 to around the end of 1633 would be necessary. Milton's resolution of mind best accords with 1637 when he was thinking of "immortality" and when his Muse was re-inspired.⁷

It is interesting to observe, if the letter was written in 1637, that soon afterwards Milton was "publishing & divulging conceived merits" though in neither *Comus* nor *Lycidas* was he the acknowledged author. Perhaps he had compromised between "desire of honour & repute & immortall fame" (is there a connection here with the remarks in the letter to Diodati, which also talks of his "obscurity"?) and "sacred reverence, & religious advisement how best to undergoe . . . so it give advantage to be more fit."

Much has been made of Milton's decision not to follow a clerical life for which he was trained and the reference to it in this letter; but that profession was mentioned only twice in the *second* draft of the letter, not in the first, and both times it is subordinated to other ideas. It was not Milton's major purpose here to argue his change of occupation; it was his purpose to pardon his belatedness. That his friend still thought about his clerical life does not mean that Milton had not previously decided not to pursue that life. In fact, the friend, who was met at least occasionally and who was apparently an older superior, is said merely "to admonish that the howres of night passe on." There is no specific urging to return to the church. Even so, Milton's rejection of the clerical life could have been recent.

The foregoing allows the possibility of 1637 as the date of writing

⁷ The crisis of Milton's future probably arose just before his renewed creativity and poetic aspirations were flowering in the autumn and winter of 1637. His apology for poetry, *Ad Patrem*, could not have been written, therefore, before this time. As it seems best placed during or after such literary activity, *Ad Patrem* may have been composed in early 1638 just before Milton left for the continent. The conclusion of H. A. Barnett ("A Time of the Year for Milton's 'Ad Patrem,'" *MLN*, LXXIII [1958], 82-83) that astronomical interpretation of lines 38-40 suggests early spring (around March 5 or around April 5) as the date of authorship corroborates the present conjecture.

of the letter to an unknown friend. On the acceptance of this, all objection to dating the whole Trinity MS. from that date forward is nullified. Under these circumstances the following conclusions may be suggested: (1) *On Time* and *Upon the Circumcision* were written before *Arcades* was transcribed (January-September 1637?); (2) *Arcades* was transcribed in the manuscript in (June-October?) 1637; (3) *At a Solemn Music* was composed; (4) later the letter was written; (5) probably next (September-October?) *On Time*, *Upon the Circumcision*, and *At a Solemn Music* were transcribed; (6) *Comus* was copied (September-October?) and revised (September-January?); and (7) *Lycidas* was written (November).

Newark College of Engineering

JOHN T. SHAWCROSS

Kennedy on Poe: An Unpublished Letter

In the spring of 1869 the Baltimore novelist John Pendleton Kennedy—frequently referred to as the patron of Edgar Allan Poe—had occasion to speak again of the younger author to one of his correspondents, G. W. Fahnestock of Philadelphia, who had sent Kennedy a daguerreotype of Poe. The letter, previously unpublished, reads in part:

... I was very intimate with Poe, during the period of his residence in this city, and followed the story of his unhappy career with great interest after he left us. I have never known, nor heard of any one, whose life so curiously illustrated that twofold existence of the *spiritual* and the *carnal* disputing the control of the man, which has often been made the theme of fiction. His was debauched by the most grovelling appetites—and exalted by the richest conception of genius.—In his special department of thought, our country has produced no poet or prose writer superior to him—indeed, I think, none equal to him.—The Photograph is very good, though it does not belong to his best days. You may see in it the sensualism which, in the later stages of his life, became conspicuous in his physiognomy.—But still, the likeness is very true and perhaps the best now extant. . . .¹

¹ Kennedy's MSS., *Letters of John P. Kennedy 1859-70*, letter to G[eorge] W[olff] Fahnestock dated Apr. 13, 1869. Fahnestock is the author of a paper on the effects of hydrogen gas on exotic plants, published in Philadelphia in 1858 in the *Proceedings of the Academy of Natural Sciences*.

I am indebted to Mr. Frank N. Jones, Director of the Peabody Institute, Baltimore, Maryland, for permission to use the Kennedy Papers and for the identification of G. W. Fahnestock.

The beginning and end of the letter, here omitted, contain no reference to Poe.

Kennedy had followed Poe's meteoric career with more than average interest and was perhaps the first of his contemporaries to grant Poe his specific gifts as a writer. He had also spoken frankly to Poe about his intemperance: "those blue devils" which periodically "buffeted" him.² In spite of his aversion to Poe's private conduct, Kennedy had acknowledged, at the time of the younger author's death, that Poe was "an original and exquisite poet, and one of the best prose critics in this country. His works are among the very best of their kind."³

Kennedy's comment in the letter to Fahnestock complements the Baltimorean's known opinion of Poe. Kennedy's judgment of Poe had not changed through the years, nor had his acquaintance with Rufus W. Griswold impaired his final opinion of his young friend—as is indicated in this previously unknown evaluation, written a year and a half before Kennedy's death.

Southern Connecticut State College

WILLIAM S. OSBORNE

The "Deaf Mute" Confidence Man: Melville's Imposter in Action

Melville's use of real people as models for characters in *The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade* is well known. The central character of this novel, moreover, had a counterpart in an actual confidence man—one who impersonated Melville himself—and whose activities in the South have been reported by Jay Leyda.¹ But the model for the deaf mute has not been identified.²

The answer to the problem of the deaf mute may be contained in two letters written in Fayetteville, North Carolina, April, 1850, and telling of a "Herman Melville," a stranger in the town who claimed to be deaf and dumb, and apparently was a confidence man also.³

¹ Henry T. Tuckerman, *Life of John Pendleton Kennedy*, 1871, p. 374, letter to Poe dated Sept. 19, 1835. The original is in the Griswold Collection of the Boston Public Library.

² Kennedy's MSS., *Journal October 26, 1848–March 18, 1850*, entry dated Oct. 10, 1849.

³ *The Melville Log* (New York, 1951), p. xxx and pp. 377-378.

⁴ John W. Shroeder, "Sources and Symbols for Melville's *Confidence-Man*," *PMLA*, LXVI (June 1951), 379.

⁵ The William Norwood Tillinghast papers now in the Duke University Library. I am grateful to Dr. Mattie Russell, who brought these letters to my attention.

When Melville entitled his first chapter of *The Confidence-Man* "A Mute Goes Aboard a Boat on the Mississippi," he employed a ruse practiced by his own impersonator in the spring of 1850, seven years before *The Confidence-Man* was published.

In late April of 1850 the "deaf and dumb" "Herman Melville" visited in the home of Samuel W. Tillinghast, a prosperous merchant in Fayetteville. Just what were his designs on the Tillinghast family is not clear, but why he played the role of deaf and dumb is quite obvious: the family had two deaf mute sons, one of whom was at home and the other was in a school for deaf mutes in Virginia. In no other role could he have established rapport with the family so quickly as in that of a deaf mute who had become a successful author in spite of such a handicap.

Two letters reveal him in action. Sarah Ann, a thirteen-year-old girl,⁴ wrote to a brother away at school on April 20, 1850.

There is a man in town that is deaf an [sic] dumb, or pretends to be he says he is the Author of Typhee [sic] and Omoo his name is Mr Herman Melville he was here last night and staid all night, Pa is delighted with him. I think 'that' he is an imposter, he says that every place he visits the people think he is an imposter, but such people ought to be treated with pity if not contempt, he pretended that he could tell all we said by the motion of our lips he writes a beautiful hand and does it with much ease and readiness, he says he was a surgeon on the south seas he was two years in the asylum at Vienna where they teach the deaf mutes to speak, that he was 6 years in Europe, knew a good many languages is very intelligent &c I do not know how to swallow all that he says he has two sisters and one brother that are deaf and dumb I suppose you remember Mr Woodward that was here a good while ago. Mr Melville knows him well, and corresponds with him: 'he says' that he (that is Mr W) lives in Cuba and married a spanish lady of large fortune and is a real mute.

Her mother wrote a letter two days later on the same sheet with Sarah Ann's in which she mentioned that "Mr Herman Melville" was still on the scene.

David is as much engaged as ever, with Mr Herman Melville, and says he wishes to go to school that he may write fast—

⁴ Another young girl, Mary J. S[mith], writing from Baltimore on December 17, 1847, to Mrs. William Ward, Norfolk, Va., told of reading *Omoo*: "Tell Mr. Ward I have been thinking of him lately, during the perusal of a book called 'Omoo,' a narrative very exciting and interesting—I think it is the kind of work to please him. *Omoo* is a continuation of 'Typee' which I have not yet read but which is the more interesting of the two. It is written by a sailor in reminiscence of a trip among the South Sea Islands, which are described in glowing colours, with many amusing incidents of sailor life and of the island natives." Letter in the Anne P. Smith papers, Duke University Library.

Mr M is so smart and intelligent that S. A.'s opinion is not to be wondered at, your Pa however, thinks he is a *true man* and mute—

No further mention is made of "Mr. Melville" in the extant family correspondence, and there is no evidence as to whether the imposter gained anything from Mr. Tillinghast, who thought him "a true man and mute." The confidence man evidently went south from Fayetteville and continued to ply his trade in South Carolina and Georgia.

Several weeks later Mr. Tillinghast made one of his periodic business trips to New York and one of his mute sons accompanied him. The two of them spent the greater part of June 1850 in New York City. One can imagine that on this visit in New York or on one of his subsequent buying trips Mr. Tillinghast inquired of Harper's about the "Melville" he had known in Fayetteville, or even got in touch with Melville himself. Almost certainly Melville would have known from this source or some other that his impersonator at times posed as a mute. His use of the word "imposter" on the first page of *The Confidence-Man* suggests that the author had in mind the imposter who had passed himself off as a deaf and dumb Herman Melville in Fayetteville.

Florida Southern College

PASCHAL REEVES

The Mill on the Floss and Keller's Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe

Some similarities between George Eliot's *The Mill on the Floss* (1860) and earlier works of nineteenth-century German fiction have already been pointed out.¹ In Gottfried Keller's well-known *novelle*, *Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe* (1856), we have, I would suggest, another German work which the English novel at times seems to echo.

We can be almost certain that George Eliot read the Keller story. George Henry Lewes' article "Realism in Art: Modern German Fiction,"² written while he and George Eliot were in Germany in the summer of 1858, includes a four-page account of Keller's collection

¹ Alfred Edwin Lussky, "George Eliot's *The Mill on the Floss* and Theodor Storm's *Immensee*," *MLJ*, x (1926), 431-433. In his unpublished doctoral dissertation (Harvard, 1916), "George Eliot and Germany," Frank Stanton Cawley presents an interesting study of the parallels between Goethe's *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* and Books VI and VII of *The Mill on the Floss*.

² *Westminster Review*, xiv (1858), 488-518. Lewes discusses Keller's *Die Leute von Seldwyla* on pp. 515-518.

Die Leute von Seldwyla dealing almost entirely with *Romeo und Julia*. It is, Lewes says, "a little *chef-d'oeuvre*," "quite a bit of genius." Although it would probably be safe to assume that George Eliot would read a story so praised by Lewes, a remark in her letter of October 28, 1858, to Sarah Hennell leaves no doubt: "The article on German Novels is Mr. Lewes's, and my only contribution to it was reading the novels aloud after dinner."³ In the following January, George Eliot was planning *The Mill on the Floss*.⁴

Naturally, there are elements in *Romeo und Julia* which are not to be found in *The Mill*. Perhaps the most significant omission is the explicit presentation of sexual love.⁵ George Eliot's novel is much longer, richer, and more varied. However, the number of important parallels in characters and events seems to me great enough to warrant a comparison.

Like *Romeo und Julia*, *The Mill on the Floss* begins with a young boy and girl, with the boy represented as the elder. Both books cover about ten years and end with the death of this pair. The order of the principal common events is the same: childhood, litigation, bankruptcy, the Romeo and Juliet situation, drowning.

We are introduced to the heroines as children. Keller's Vrenchen is five years old, while Maggie Tulliver is nine when we see her first. Both are dark-haired, bright-eyed; even Vrenchen's "*braunliche Gesichtsfarbe*" has its counterpart in Maggie's frequently-lamented brown complexion. Cruelty to dolls is an unusual subject for a novelist, but it is a common subject here. Vrenchen's afternoon of play is devoted to the careful, almost ritualistic, dismembering and burial of her doll. In the seclusion of the Tulliver attic, Maggie grinds the head of her doll against the rough bricks of the chimney. Their teen-age lives are also similar. Both are the daughters of men ruined by "lawin'." Each has a tragic love affair with the son of her father's enemy. In the end, both are drowned in a river, Vrenchen at sixteen, Maggie at nineteen.

Sali, the hero of *Romeo und Julia*, is, at least superficially, like

³ *The George Eliot Letters*, Gordon S. Haight, ed. (New Haven, 1954), II, 486.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 33.

⁵ Lewes' article recommends *Romeo und Julia* to male readers only. He was vexed "to think that a man of genius should write a story which, because of a few sentences that might perfectly well have been omitted . . . , cannot be read aloud in the family circle." It seems very likely that, like Dorothea Brooke, George Eliot might "read anything now she's married."

three different young men in *The Mill on the Floss*. As a childhood playmate of the heroine, he is like young Tom Tulliver in Books I and II. As Vrenchen's lover and the son of a family enemy, he resembles Philip Wakem in Books III, IV, and V. Transformed again, though still in a lover's role, he is Stephen Guest in Book VI. (It is conceivable that Stephen's row boat owes something to Sali's hay barge). Finally, as a companion in the heroine's death by water, he is again Tom Tulliver.

Keller's Capulet, Marti, is much closer to Mr. Tulliver than his Montague, Manz, is to Mr. Wakem. In *Romeo und Julia*, both men squander their time and money on foolish lawsuits and are ruined. In *The Mill*, only Tulliver is reduced to bankruptcy. However, both Keller and George Eliot present the two old men in a scene of physical violence; like Vrenchen, a weeping Maggie drags her father from the scuffle.

Similarities of tone are harder to pin down, but I think, to cite one example, the two writers are especially close in their graceful rendering of the happiness and sorrow of childhood play. There are, as well, some general points of likeness, the use of an omniscient point of view or the occasional intrusion of the narrator to comment upon the action, though these are characteristic of most of the fiction of the period. (It is interesting to note that one of Keller's editorial comments is on that favorite George Eliot theme, retribution).

These are the important points of similarity. The details of these parallel situations are usually different. For example, though Tom and Maggie, like Vrenchen and Sali, play together, Keller's children share the pleasures of mutilating the doll, while Maggie tortures her fetish in solitude. Keller's pair drown themselves, a merciful escape from an unbearable life. George Eliot calls the death of Tom and Maggie "The Final Rescue," but they die by accident in the flood. She allows none of her heroines the luxury of suicide.

There do not seem to be any specific references to Keller in George Eliot's letters or journals, and the differences between Keller's and her handling of similar situations are conspicuous enough to warn us against over-emphasizing her debt to *Romeo und Julia*. But if we cannot call it a "source," surely we are justified in calling *Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe* a striking analogue to *The Mill on the Floss*.

Harvard University

ALLAN CASSON

T. S. Eliot's Case-Book

Does *The Family Reunion* really "conform so closely to the classic formula" of the English detective story as David W. Evans suggests?¹ Surely Agatha's statement,

What we have written is not a story of detection,
Of crime and punishment, but of sin and expiation,

removes the play from the restricted and stereotyped area of the detective story—where plot is everything and character counts for very little—to an area where the psychological investigations of character are all-important. If Eliot has a "case-book" it is the psychiatrist's rather than the detective-inspector's.

But if the detective story is not behind the play, there is a novelist, and, I believe, a particular novel. A few years ago, Mr. Robert Liddell, in his *Treatise on the Novel*, put forward the suggestion (which, so far as I am aware, has not been taken up by other critics) that the play has been influenced by the novels of Miss Ivy Compton-Burnett. He writes:

It is not surprising that the only successful, living writer of English verse tragedy should show signs of Miss Compton-Burnett's influence both on the dialogue and the situation of *The Family Reunion*—though its action is more diffuse and less tragic than the greater moments in her novels. Perhaps it is not entirely fanciful to see Mr. Eliot acknowledging this influence when he names one of his characters Ivy, and gives another an invitation to stay at "Compton-Smith's place in Dorset."²

From his evaluation of the play one might dissent; his other suggestions, on which he does not elaborate, can be taken further.

Dealing with the last, and minor, point first, the fancifulness of seeing an influence in the names Eliot uses, can be made less fantastic by noting that "Agatha" occurs both in the play and in *Men and Wives*, the novel which most resembles it, and to which I shall return in a moment; that another character in this novel is called Geraldine, while the play contains a Gerald, and that the latter's mention of an invitation to "Compton-Smith's place" is immediately followed by Violet's announcement that she should be helping Lady Bumpus at the Vicar's American tea. Bumpus is the name of a character in *Pastors and Masters*.

¹ "The Case Book of T. E. Eliot," *MLN*, LXXI (Nov. 1956), 501.

² Robert Liddell, *A Treatise on the Novel* (London, 1947), p. 159.

These parallels are only superficial, and affect the value of the play no more than Miss Compton-Burnett's practice of choosing literary names for her characters (Keats, Donne, Lamb, etc.) affects the value of her novels. But there are more significant parallels than this.

One is an affinity of technique. It is a commonplace that Miss Compton-Burnett's narrative method is to rely almost entirely on dialogue, and to use descriptions of action and physical appearance only in the manner of stage directions. Another, and closer, affinity is that of language. It is apparent that her mature style, tight, clipped and oracular as it often is, comes very close at times to the heightened and exact language of poetry. I believe it to be no accident, therefore, that we can put the following passage from *Daughters and Sons* alongside one from *The Family Reunion*.

So you are all here. . . . I do not want to be shut up alone; I do not want that sort of comfort. That is a poor kind, though it is the kind we are given. So you have all had breakfast? . . . And a good breakfast too. Yes, you have had it as usual; you have made no difference. And my Hetta is where she does not need it. She will never eat again. And she has thought of it so often for all of you. She has taught you to think of it for yourselves. That is how you know. Yes, you know how to manage, don't you? You will say that Hetta was no good; I see it coming.

This, from the lips of the domestic tyrant of the novel, is very like a speech by Amy, the domestic tyrant of *The Family Reunion*.

So you will all leave me!

An old woman alone in a damned house.

I will let the walls crumble. Why should I worry

To keep the tiles on the roof, combat the endless weather,

Resist the wind? fight with increasing taxes

And unpaid rents and tithes? nourish investments

With wakeful nights and patient calculations

With the solicitor, the broker, agent? Why should I?

It is no concern of the body in the tomb

To bother about the upkeep. Let the wind and rain do that.

The novel which comes nearest to the play, however, is *Men and Wives*, published in 1931. The heroine, Lady Harriet Haslam, is a tyrannical hypochondriac who is put into an asylum after an attempt at suicide. For a while the family enjoy their release from the pressure of her obsessive personality, but she recovers sufficiently to return home. Whereupon, her son Matthew, who sees that she will destroy his proposed marriage with Camilla, murders her. But when he

confesses this to his family, they simply refuse to believe him. They say he is the victim of a delusion, and their view is confirmed by the family doctor. This situation is paralleled in the play without radical transformation. Amy and Harriet are both domestic tyrants, and although Harry (unlike Matthew) is really suffering from the delusion that he is a murderer, his dead wife is exactly the same type as Harriet, using her illness as a means of moral blackmail. "She wouldn't leave him alone," says Downing, the manservant, and when asked if she ever talked of suicide he replies:

Oh yes, she did, every now and again.
But in my opinion, it is those who talk
That are the least likely. To my way of thinking
She only did it to frighten people.
If you take my meaning—just for the effect.

Even more remarkable, however, are the resemblances between these two passages.

"He may have thought it out, or something like it, in his brain," said Gregory in a deliberate, quiet tone, "and then imagined himself doing it afterwards. These troubles have set our minds running on such things. That is what it must be."

He has probably let this notion grow in his mind,
Living among strangers, with no one to talk to.
I suspect it is simply the wish to get rid of her
Makes him believe he did. He cannot trust his good fortune.

Each of these resemblances, taken in isolation, might be mere coincidence. Together they amount to a seeming affinity that would repay detailed investigation. As an immediate additional point one might note that even the very "feel" of a typical Compton-Burnett country house is similar to that of Wishwood.

One fundamental difference remains, however. Believing as he does in the truths of the Christian religion, Eliot cannot but maintain that evil must be fought by good. So Harry, unlike Matthew, cannot be an actual murderer if he is to be "the consciousness of his unhappy family, its bird sent flying through the purgatorial flame." Eliot must believe, or at least hope, that good will ultimately prevail. Miss Compton-Burnett, as she reveals herself in her novels, has no such spiritual resources. More directly, she has committed herself to the statement that "life makes great demands on people's characters, and gives them . . . great opportunity to serve their own ends by the sacrifice of other people. Such ill-doing may meet with little retribu-

tion, may indeed be hardly recognised, and I cannot feel so surprised if people yield to it."² It is in the family that ill-doing may best avoid retribution, especially when it is done by the dominating father or mother figure. This is what happens in *The Family Reunion*, and that is why at this point in his work Eliot is very close to Miss Compton-Burnett, whatever the ultimate difference in their beliefs may be.

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D. S. BLAND

Eliot's "The Hollow Men" and Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*

In addition to the obvious influence of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* also deserves notice as an equally pervasive force in T. S. Eliot's "The Hollow Men," a force that is both positive and negative. George Williamson somewhat tentatively has proposed Brutus's metaphorical description of "A hot friend cooling" (Cassius) as the source of Eliot's title:¹

When love begins to sicken and decay
It useth an enforced ceremony.
There are no tricks in plain and simple faith;
But hollow men, like horses hot at hand,
Make gallant show and promise of their mettle;
But when they should endure the bloody spur
They fall their crests, and, like deceitful jades,
Sink in the trial. (IV. ii. 20-27)

But Eliot's allusion is even richer than the mere borrowing of the title. The sickening and decaying of love in this passage, for example, is pertinent to the unbridged gulf between lustful desire and potency on the one hand and the meaningful completeness of creation and the active existence of love on the other, presented in section V of "The Hollow Men" (the theme is also dominant, of course, in *Prufrock*, the Sweeney poems, *The Waste Land*, and other poems as well). The lack of plain and simple faith Brutus speaks of is reflected by the averted and non-direct eyes of the hollow men (section I), by the "fading star" and broken stone images of section III of the poem.

¹ An interview with M. Jourdain in *Orion*, no. 1.

² *A Reader's Guide to T. S. Eliot* (New York, 1953), pp. 154-155.

And finally the "tricks" mentioned in Brutus's indictment become in Eliot the "deliberate disguises" assumed by the hollow men to avoid death and to hide their own emptiness. Shakespeare's conspirators, we recall from Portia's words (II. i. 276-278), come to Brutus's house,

Some six or seven, who did hide their faces
Even from darkness.

Even Brutus himself in a moment of doubt (though it is clear that he has "direct eyes") ponders the shadow that falls

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
.
.
.
Between the conception
And the creation.

Thus Brutus wrestles with this doubt:

Since Cassius first did whet me against Caesar
I have not slept.
Between the acting of a dreadful thing
And the first motion, all the interim is
Like a phantasma or a hideous dream. (II. i. 61-65, my italics)

Although Eliot has apparently sanctioned Dowson's "Non Sum Qualis Eram Bonae Sub Regno Cynarae" as the source for the Shadow² ("betwixt her lips and mine / There fell thy shadow"), it is difficult to deny the pertinence of Brutus's words here.

I see these references as of negative force, that is, those which intensify the nullity of Eliot's "men." But by making them as specific as he does, Eliot also asks us to consider at the same time the essentially positive force of Shakespeare's entire play, and particularly of those characters who are, whatever else they are, the opposite of "hollow." Whatever we may think of their politics, motives, divergent characters, it is clear that Brutus, Cassius, and their fellow conspirators do not lean together with headpieces filled with straw. Their voices, like those of Guy Fawkes and the Gunpowder Plot conspirators alluded to in Eliot's epigraph, are not "dried," and their whispers, like Kurtz's,³ are hardly "quiet and meaningless." They cross to

² See Geoffrey Tillotson, *Essays in Criticism and Research* (Cambridge, 1942), p. 156 n; Williamson, *Reader's Guide*, p. 161.

³ Marlowe describes Kurtz's dying whisper ("The horror! The horror!")

"death's other Kingdom" with direct eyes, with unparalyzed force; and in the "last of meeting places" Brutus and Cassius do not "grope" or "avoid speech" though the "river" into which they are about to plunge is certainly "tumid" (*Caesar* V. i. 113-126). The shadow does fall momentarily but it is dispelled, prayer and action are both possible, and the world ends for "a man" (*Caesar* V. v. 75) with a considerable "bang."

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ROBERT F. GLECKNER

The Wake in Faulkner's *Sanctuary*

Faulkner's *Sanctuary*, with perhaps extreme fictional license, nakedly exposes the dislocation of the traditional values of love and justice in the modern world, and it implicitly traces the ultimate source of this moral chaos to the triumph of the forces of the antichrist. The evil demiurge is, I believe, figured in Popeye whose birth on Christmas Day ironically foreshadows his agency in the degradation of common human dignity and virtue. His sexual impotence and his criminal vocation are particular objectifications of the universal corruption that is undermining the foundations of cultural solidarity. In this perspective the scene of Red's wake climaxes Faulkner's dramatization of a tragic spiritual catastrophe.

The setting of the wake (Ch. XXV) is a roadhouse and gambling joint. Its name, "the Grotto," is one of the many religious inversions of the title of the novel. In this case it can be associated with the traditional cave-manger symbolism of the birth of Christ.¹ The coffin of Temple Drake's redeemer in sexual love lies in the gambling room on a crap table, and the location suggests that the unholy triad, Popeye, Temple, and Red, have recklessly diced away their eternal salvation. Faulkner, I think, affirms this interpretation in the drunken, mock priest who officiates at the ceremony of the wake. For the celebrant's name Gene (a diminutive of Eugene, etymologically,

as a "vibrating note of revolt" expressing "some sort of belief" with "candour" and "conviction." The Guy Fawkes epigraph, of course, symbolizes for Eliot the modern hollowing and drying of what was once vibrant, meaningful, and whole.

¹ According to most Biblical authorities, Joseph and Mary were "compelled to lodge for the night in a cattle-manger which . . . was a cave close to the inn" (Alan W. Watts, *Myth and Ritual in Christianity* [New York: The Vanguard Press, 1953], p. 119).

well-born or of noble race) is a blasphemous parallel to the ideal of perfection connected with his role. And as his grotesque sacerdotal mannerisms imply, he is participating in a burlesque of the Eucharistic sacrament: "proprietary, adjurant, sweating, he resumed his harsh monologue, mopping his face on his sleeve. 'Come on, folks, it's all on Gene. I aint nothing but a bootlegger, but he never had a better friend than me. Step up and drink, folks.'" Ironically, of course, this rite seeks to perpetuate the remembrance of sacrificial lust, not selfless love.

This profane Mass for the Dead culminates in a travesty of the crucifixion. When Red is tumbled out of his coffin, he is accidentally vested with a crown of thorns: "When they raised the corpse the wreath came too, attached to him by a hidden end of wire driven in his cheek." This turn of events, consistently enough, is instigated by a "woman in red," Faulkner's surrogate for the Whore of Babylon, who is interested only in temporal pleasures: "'open the game. Get the damn stiff out of here and open the game.'" When the shout is accompanied by "a burst of filthy language," there seems little doubt about her prototype. But this scene is not a prophecy of the fall of the new Babylon. Rather, as the total pattern of action in the novel seems to indicate, the minions of the antichrist have converted the world, even as Faulkner asserts, into a universal "pandemonium."

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The Truth of Frost's "Directive"

Frost's "Directive" has both gratified and dismayed readers. While its artistic attainment has been clear, its intellectual complexity has not been, and admirers of the poem have come to conclude that though "Directive" is "easy to love,"¹ it is not so easy to understand. An explication and interpretation will demonstrate the central meaning of the poem and its important place in Frost's thought.

Essentially a religious poem, it derives its basic abstractions from traditional religious symbol and reference, and its title, with its imperative force, reflects a didactic purpose; but the meaning is unconventional. The lost and the saved conditions are the poet's themes, and the thought pivots, in a way unique with Frost, around St. Mark's

¹ Randall Jarrell, *Poetry and the Age* (New York, 1953), p. 48.

well-known dictum (16:16): "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned."² This verse Frost subjects to his own special whimsy and quiet irony; the "saved" are those few who are willing to lose themselves in the poet's personal, unsophisticated, and unritualistic discoveries of the spirit.

The poem opens informally and develops into an invitation for the reader to accompany the poet on a journey away from a confusing present to an earlier time "made simple" and deprived of its physical detail by the intervening years:

Back out of all this now too much for us,
Back in a time made simple by the loss
Of detail, burned, dissolved, and broken off
Like graveyard marble sculpture in the weather. . . .

The reader, Frost assumes, is "lost enough," enough confused and adrift in life, to want to find himself; and the poet, the Virgil-figure "who only has at heart your getting lost,"³ will guide him on his paradoxical route to self-discovery. The poet directs the way: seek out some site, he counsels, where the evidences of man have nearly crumbled away. Pilgrimage to a humble spot, some unobtrusive but now fairly inaccessible place where grain was carted and apples gathered, and where children romped. The specific journey he chooses leads to an abandoned town and farm on a mountain side. The ledges of the road leading up are "monolithic," difficult, and scarred (the prevailing Christian belief that the way to truth is not easy, comes to mind). As they climb, the poet-guide reassures his guest that he has nothing to fear from the eeriness of the trip: a goliath, "Glacier," locked like Dante's Anteus in ice, still haunts the land; from the banks along the difficult route, forty pairs of animal eyes (grotesques) regard the visitors; and the magic woods, excited, send "light rustle rushes to their leaves." The poet further seeks to allay his guest's fears by introducing the homely, salving image of the eyes in the firkins:⁴

² There are echoes too of Christ's instruction to his disciples (Matthew 10:39): "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."

³ A Dante-like weariness is also the partial-theme of "Birches":

It's when I'm weary of considerations,
And life is too much like a pathless wood
Where your face burns and tickles with the cobwebs
Broken across it, and one eye is weeping
From a twig's having lashed across it open.

⁴ I assume that Frost imagines these quarter-barrel butter-tubs turned on their sides in a darkened root-cellar.

Nor need you mind the serial ordeal
Of being watched from forty cellar holes
As if by eye pairs out of forty firkins.

As they approach the scattered traces of an old farm, the poet directs his friend, if he feels "lost enough to find himself by now," to close the road to any other intruder; his discovery is to be a highly personal one:

pull in your ladder road behind you
And put a sign up CLOSED to all but me.
Then make yourself at home.

They stand on a height where town and farm once met ("where two village cultures faded / Into each other"). The only remaining field is "no bigger than a harness gall"; where the house once stood is "a belilaced cellar hole" slowly closing "like a dent in dough"; and beneath a pine lie "some shattered dishes" which call to mind "playthings in the playhouse of children." "Weep," the poet advises his friend, over the transitory nature of man and all his works, over his efforts to shape nature, over his intense life—all of which close over as inevitably as dents in dough.⁵

Yet, in this forlorn decay, what is eternal and unchanging? The brook from which the house took its water, a brook spring-cold and so proud to be near its source it never rages, is unchanging. Water to Frost is a symbol of life, of that permanent, vital fluid of Nature which man shares with all living things. In "West-Running Brook," the wife explains that the eddy of the stream pays tribute to its source, and adds, "it is from this in nature that we are from." In "Directive," man is, in a metaphoric way, the brook's eddy returning for revitalization to its source. Frost implies that somehow in the pursuit of our intricate, frenetic lives we forget elemental natural verities, and that only by "being versed in country things" shall we be saved: by understanding that birds do not weep over decayed farms and towns; and by recognizing a more supremely difficult truth, a genuinely sceptical view as opposed to orthodoxy, that man is but one in the grand natural cycle and his passing is of no more consequence than the drying up of Hyla Brook, the slow decay of an abandoned rick of firewood, or the death of a hired man.⁶

⁵ Other poems, "Provide, Provide," "The Census Taker," "In A Disused Graveyard," "The Birthplace," and "After Apple Picking" also make this observation.

⁶ See "Hyla Brook," "The Need of Being Versed in Country Things," "The Wood-Pile," and "The Death of the Hired Man."

This is only a part of the poet's truth; for more meaningful than our awareness of man's impermanence, is the commitment such knowledge imposes upon us. What remains is the self—the man apart who closes his area of truth to all except himself and his guide. Through drinking from the goblet-Grail hidden in the cedar, we may come to the wisdom that the self alone is all we have—but that is enough; and by contemplating this stark need for a self-reliant view it is possible to become “whole again beyond confusion.”⁷ The goblet is Frost's poem itself. The communion-baptism, since this goblet is like the Grail, is through water, the wine of Nature, and with the self:

I have kept hidden in the instep arch
Of an old cedar at the waterside
A broken drinking goblet like the Grail
Under a spell so the wrong ones can't find it,
So can't get saved, as Saint Mark says they mustn't.
(I stole the goblet from the children's playhouse.)
Here are your waters and your watering place
Drink and be whole again beyond confusion.

The experience is a religious one; but it is religious only in a broad, almost existential sense (Frost makes no reference to a deity; his view is that of a world in which man endures with whatever fortitude of mind and spirit he alone can muster against his own impermanence).⁸ In Frost's spectrum, the damned are the conventional, shut from any full knowing of their potential worth as individuals of independent act and conviction; the saved are the unorthodox, child-like in their response to nature, who accept the full rewards and obligations of a private integrity and a self-reliant courage.⁹

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⁷ The independent, sceptical attitudes of “Design,” “The White-Tailed Hornet,” “The Most of It,” and “Neither Out Far Nor in Deep” are especially relevant here.

⁸ Even though Frost's concern with Nature suggests a kind of Emersonian pantheism, as it does in such other poems as “Good-Bye and Keep Cold,” “A Prayer in Spring,” and “I Will Sing You One-O,” in “Directive” the truth is the universal aloneness of man.

⁹ The paradox of the child's attitude and the playhouse further suits Frost's method: just as the believer finds himself in losing himself, so he gains wisdom through becoming a child. See Matthew 18: 2, 3: “And Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them,

“And said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” The stealing of the goblet is symbolic of a child's act.

The Evidence of Early Mentions of the Archpriest of Hita or of His Work

So little is known of the life of the Archpriest or of the early "fortune" of his *Libro* that any scrap of evidence, be it ever so small, which comes to light is seized upon avidly by students in this field and made to yield the maximum amount of information that can be squeezed from it. Sometimes it happens that a tiny scintilla of evidence is magnified far beyond its true worth and made to yield unjustified and even erroneous deductions.¹ Diligent and patient research over the years has turned up some early references to the Archpriest and his Book, but as yet no one has brought these scattered references together in one *étude d'ensemble* and evaluated them both singly and collectively as part of a total picture.

1. Evidence from the text proper of the *Libro de Buen Amor*.

The first place where one would naturally look for biographical information on an author is in his work, and thus we shall proceed in the case of our author. In the text proper we find the author calling himself "Juan Ruiz" on two occasions. Stanza 19 reads as follows (the quotations being made from Ms. G, with the variants of Ms. S in parentheses; Ms. T lacks these lines):

(E) Porque de todo el bien es comienço e Rayz,
la Virgen Santa Maria, por ende yo Juan rruyz,
açipreste de Fita dello (della) primero fiz'
cantar de los sus gozos siete que asy (ansi) diz'.

But this stanza is suspect on at least two counts. In the first place, its rhythm lacks the lilt and smoothness so typical of the verses of the Archpriest. It is rough and broken, in fact, it smacks more of rhymed prose than of poetry. In the second place, it merely serves as an introduction to the *Gozos* which follow, and these seem to interrupt the natural continuity of the poem, and so much so that one is justified in suspecting that even if the *Gozos* are not intercalated here by the copyist at least this introductory verse is.

Stanza 575 reads:

Yo Johan Ruyz, el sobredicho acipreste de Hita,
pero que mi coraçon de trobar non se quita,

¹ L. G. Moffatt, "The Imprisonment of the Archpriest," *Hispania*, XXXIII (1950), 321-327.

nunca falle tal dueña como a vos Amor pynta,
nin creo que la falla en toda esta cohyta.

This stanza is even more suspicious than the first one. First, it is found only in Ms. S and omitted by Ms. G, although the folios in the latter contain all the rest of this passage. Furthermore, Cejador rejects this stanza on the same grounds that make us suspicious of the authenticity of 19 above.² It is apparent that the scribe of Ms. S, by his use of the word *sobredicho*, is harking back to stanza 19.

In one passage the author calls himself "Fita": "Que yo mucho faria por mi amor de Fyta" (845, a). This is found in both Mss. S and G. These words were spoken by Doña Endrina to Trotaconventos with reference to her suitor and represent a slip on the part of the author as elsewhere throughout this whole episode he goes under the name of Don Melón de la Huerta.

Other than these cases, the author in his text identifies himself only as "açipreste" eight times, to wit:

- 6, d: "tu açipreste . . .", in opening invocation, spoken by author;
- 13, b: "tu açipreste . . .", in prayer after prose prologue, spoken by the author;
- 423, b: "açipreste . . .", spoken by Don Amor to author;
- 930, a: "açipreste . . .", spoken by Trotaconventos to author;
- 946, b: "açipreste . . .", spoken by "la vieja" to author;
- 1318, c: "açipreste . . .", spoken by Trotaconventos to author;
- 1345, a: "a un açipreste sirvo . . .", spoken by Trotaconventos to Doña Garoça referring to author;
- 1484, b: "ese açipreste . . .", spoken by Doña Garoça to Trotaconventos asking her to describe the author, who is seeking her favors.

In the episode of the monks of Talavera, appended *hors texte* only by the scribe of Ms. S, the appellation "açipreste" is twice used to designate the bearer of the evil tidings: "aqueste açipreste que traya el mandado" (1691, a) and "Ffabló este açipreste" (1692, a). However, since there is not the slightest indication that the author is identifying himself with Don Gil's emissary, there is no justification in including these two in the above list.

In only one other passage of the text is there a possible biographical reference: 1510, a, "Uno que es de Alcalá," spoken by Trotaconventos to the Moorish girl in referring to the author. That is what Ms. S has, but Ms. G reads: "Uno que mora en Alcalá" and Ms. T: "Uno

² Julio Cejador y Frauca, ed., *Libro de Buen Amor* by Juan Ruiz, Arcipreste de Hita (Madrid, 1913), I, 209, n. 3.

que es en la villa." Cejador uses this verse as evidence that the author was a native of Alcalá,³ but the variations in the manuscripts and the exigency of the rhyme make this conjecture highly unconvincing.

It should be noted that in the *explicit* of the *Libro de Buen Amor*, Mss. S and T (G is missing here), there is no mention of the author's name or status. Thus we read in stanza 1634:

Era de mill e trescientos e ochento e un años (T: mill e tresyentos e sesenta e ocho años)

Fué compuesto el rromance (T: fué acabado este lybro)

por muchos males e daños,

Que fassen muchos e muchas a otras con sus engaños,

E por mostrar a los synples fablas e versos estraños.

2. Evidence of the Manuscripts.

In the scribal additions to the texts we have the rubrics supplied by the scribe of Ms. S, and the scribal colophons of Mss. S and G. In the rubrics, we find the author referred to twenty-eight times simply as *açipreste*, and no other designation is given him. The scribal colophon of Ms. S reads, following stanza 1709: "Este es el libro del Arçipreste de Hita . . .," but in the colophon of G, the earlier manuscript, no name is mentioned: "Fenito libro, graçias á Domino Nostro JesuXristo. Este libro fué acabado jueves XXIII de jullio del año del nascimiento del nuestro salvador JesuXristo de mill e tresientos e ochento e nueve años."

And this is all the manuscripts offer us.

3. The Gil de Albornoz documents.

A great deal has been made of these two items in furnishing presumptive evidence of the approximate date of the Archpriest's death. But an objective analysis of them casts doubt on the validity of the conclusions that some have drawn. In a document dated June 16, 1350 emitted by Don Gil de Albornoz, then archbishop of Toledo, given at the monastery of San Blas de Villaviciosa, province of Guadalajara and quite close to Hita, directing the archpriest of Hita to turn over certain properties to San Blas, we read: ". . . ceterorum Archipresbyterium de Fita, vel ejus locum tenenti, tenore praesentium comitemus. . . ." ⁴ Sanchez' supposition that his source for this document—Baltasar Porreño, *Vida del Cardenal don Gil de Albornoz*, Cuenca, 1646, f. 34—had omitted the name of the archpriest in ques-

³Cejador y Frauca, II, 226 n.

⁴Juan Loperraez Corvalan, *Descripción Histórica del Obispado de Osmá*, in *Colección diplomática* (Madrid, 1788), III, 261-262, No. CVI.

tion is without foundation.⁵ Note that no name is given for the archpriest of Hita, and that Gil de Alborno was apparently not sure at this date whether there was an officially installed priest or simply an acting one.

This same Gil de Alborno, in connection with another donation to the monastery of San Blas, issues another document on January 7, 1351. But this document is given at Avignon, France, for Gil had given up his archbiscopric of Toledo to become Cardinal and had removed to the papal seat at Avignon between June 16, 1350 and January 7, 1351. The pertinent passage of this second document reads: "... nobitque Petrus Ferrandi, Archiprester et majordomus noster in Archpresbyterium de Fita. . . . Et dicto Petro Ferrandi tenore praesentium mandamus ut vobis. . . ." ⁶ As we shall see later, all that this tells us is that on January 7, 1351, a certain Pedro Fernández was Archpriest of Hita.

4. *The Portuguese Fragments.*

These contain 144 lines of the *Libro de Buen Amor* in a Portuguese translation, in a manuscript of the last third of the fourteenth century.⁷ But they represent apparently a copy made from an earlier translation which must be dated therefore around 1370, and should not be confused with the translation known to have been in the library of King Duarte.⁸ All that we learn from these fragments, however, is that the *Libro* was well enough known and thought of to be translated into Portuguese a few years after its final redaction in Spanish. 5. From Portugal also comes another item attesting to the early literary reputation of the Archpriest. The inventory of the library of King Duarte (1438) contains this notation: "O acipreste de fyta."⁹ There is reason to believe, however, that this work was one of the literary items inherited by Duarte from his father King John I, so that its date is much prior to 1438, probably going back to the latter years of the fourteenth century.¹⁰

⁵ Tomás Antonio Sánchez, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, LVII, *Poetas Castellanos Anteriores al Siglo XV* (ed. Janer, Madrid, 1864), xxxiii.

⁶ Corvalan, *Descripción* etc., loc. cit., no. CVII.

⁷ Antonio G. Solalinde, "Fragmentos de una traducción portuguesa del *Libro de Buen Amor*," *Revista de Filología Española*, I (1914), 162-172.

⁸ L. G. Moffatt, "An Evaluation of the Portuguese Fragments of the *Libro de Buen Amor*," *Symposium*, X (1956), 109-111.

⁹ A. C. Sousa, *História genealógica da Casa Real Portuguesa*, *Provas*, I, 529-548; C. Michaëlis, *Cancioneiro de Ajuda*, II, 129 and *Romania*, XXVIII, 543; Joseph N. Piel, in *Appendix* to his ed. of *O Leal Conselheiro* (Lisbon, 1942).

¹⁰ L. G. Moffatt, art. cit. *supra*.

6. *The Jongleur's Repertoire.*

On a blank sheet of a fourteenth century manuscript of the *Crónicas Generales*,¹¹ Menéndez Pidal discovered what appears to be a program of the "boniments" of a jongleur, ascribed by him to the early fifteenth century, and including some ten badly jumbled lines from the *Libro de Buen Amor* introduced as follows: "Agora començemos del libro del Acipreste." This is the only reference to authorship made by the jongleur, but Menéndez Pidal thinks he finds the name *Ruiz* used in punning in two passages: "Nuestro cazurro, en el num. 25 trabuca también, y dice 'ruiz' por 'ruin,' como en el num. 29 'ruiznes' [por 'rruines'.]"¹² There are, however, several reasons for objecting to Menéndez Pidal's view on this point. In the first place, this manuscript is full of errors, so much so that Menéndez himself says it is very difficult to comprehend. In the second place, the supposed puns are not in the passages from the Archpriest, but are well beyond them, and in a context that has no connection with them. Finally No. 26 has "querias" for "querian," or the same error of *s* for *n*, with no possibility of a pun being meant. It seems that if the jongleur had wanted to pun on the Archpriest's name (and there is no evidence that he even knew it) he would have done so in the passages he declares to be his. The significance of this little item as an indication of the popular vogue of the Archpriest at this early period is aptly expressed by Menéndez Pidal (*Poesía etc.*, 270-271): "... ese cazurro del siglo XV que, al sentir desfallecer el interés de su público, le daba una sacudida con palabras mágicas: 'Agora comencemos del Libro del Arcipreste,' seguro de que este simple anuncio hacía al auditorio regocijarse de antemano . . . : el *Libro de Buen Amor* aparecía así como el finisterre de toda *juglaría*."

7. *The Cancioneiro de Baena.*

At least one of the poets represented in the *Cancioneiro de Baena* was well acquainted with the *Libro de Buen Amor* as evidenced by his use of the fabliau "Pitas Payas" so amusingly recounted by the Archpriest. The first part of one of the poems in the *Cancioneiro* reads thus:

Señor Juan Alfonso, pintor de taurique
Qual fué Pitas Payas, el de la fablilla,

¹¹ R. Menéndez Pidal, *Catálogo de Crónicas Generales de España*, 1st ed. (Madrid, 1899), p. 9; and *Poesía juglaresca y juglares* (Madrid, 1924), pp. 270-271; 302-307; 462-467.

¹² Menéndez Pidal, *Poesía, etc.*, p. 305 n.

Maguer vos andades aca por la villa
 A vuestra muger bien ay quien la nique,
 Que ella se flota de baxo del chazminique
 A muy fuertes golpes con los de la mesta,
 Por ende, sed cierto, sy á mi me lo empresta,
 Que juegos le fa el çiquesique.¹³

The book containing this allusion was composed between the years 1445-1454, but contains some poems written much earlier, back indeed to the latter years of the fourteenth century.¹⁴ The poem in question is attributed to a certain Ferrant Manuel, who is already old in 1414,¹⁵ so that it is reasonable to conclude that he wrote it in the early years of the fifteenth century at the latest.

8. The *Corbacho*. (1438).

Martínez de Toledo, Arcipreste de Talavera, author of *El Corbacho*, shows throughout this work an intimate knowledge of the book of our Archpriest, one of the alternate titles of his volume—*Libro del Arcipreste de Talavera llamado Reprobación del Amor Mundano*—recalling at once the theme our Archpriest claims for his work. Indeed, he cites him twice by name; firstly thus: "E exemplo antiguo es, el cual puso el arcipreste de Fita en su tractado."¹⁶ The *exemplo* referred to is the one concerning the request by the frogs to Jupiter for a king, but the application is to a quite different end in the two authors. The lines quoted, however, by Martínez de Toledo are taken almost verbatim from the *Libro de Buen Amor*: "Quien pudiere ser suyo, non sea enajenado, que libertad e franqueza non es por oro comprada," and the Archpriest of Hita (stanza 206):

Quien tiene lo que le cumple, con ello sea pagado,
 Quien puede ser suyo non sea enajenado;
 El que non toviere premia, non quiera ser apremiado:
 Lybertad é soltura non es por oro conplado.

The other reference in the *Corbacho* is: "Dize el Arcipreste: 'Sab-

¹³ Eugenio de Ochoa, *El Cancioneiro de Juan Alfonso de Baena* (Madrid, 1851), p. 426, No. 362. Cf. also L. G. Moffatt, "Pitas Payas" in *South Atlantic Studies for Sturgis E. Leavitt* (Washington, 1953), pp. 29-37.

¹⁴ Ochoa, *El Cancioneiro*, etc., p. xliii: "Aunque este cancionero se compilo á mediadas del siglo XV, contiene obras de poetas y trovadores pertenecientes al siglo XIV. . . ."

¹⁵ Ochoa, *El Cancioneiro*, etc., p. 651.

¹⁶ Martínez de Toledo, *Libro del Arcipreste de Talavera llamado Reprobación del Amor Mundano o Corbacho* (ed. of José Rogerio Sánchez) in *Biblioteca Clásica*, CCLVIII (Madrid, 1930), 92; in Lesley Byrd Simpson's edition (Berkeley, 1939), p. 21.

yeza tenprado callar; locura demasiado (or, desmayado) hablar?"¹⁷ While the Archpriest of Hita at times does stress the desirability of silence or restrained speech, these exact words are not to be found in his *Libro de Buen Amor*. The Archpriest of Talavera may be thinking of the following passages:

- (553) En todas los tus fechos, en fablar é en ál,
Escoge la medida é lo que es comunal.
(569) El buen callar cien sueldos vale en toda plaça.
(722) Mijor cosa es al ome é cuerdo é entendido,
Callar do no le empeçe, é tyenle por sesudo,
Que fablar lo que no l'eunple, porque se'arrepentudo:
Ó piensa bien lo que fablas ó calle; faste mudo.

9. *The Marqués de Santillana.*

Around the middle of the fifteenth century, we run across a cryptic reference to our Archpriest by the Marqués de Santillana in his famous letter to the Constable of Portugal (1445-1449): "Entre nosotros usóse el metro en assaz formas; asy como *El Libro de Alixandre, Los Votos del Pavón*, é aun el libro del Archypreste de Hita."¹⁸ Apparently the Marqués knew Juan Ruiz and his work only under the caption he cites—"El libro del Archypreste de Hita." The "aun" he uses would seem to indicate surprise at the skillful use of meter in a poem so popular, so unlearned (in his mind) and so unacquainted with the new "itálico modo" as the *Libro de Buen Amor*.

10. *Gómez de Castro's Quotations.*

There follows a blank of about a century in our chronology until probably the middle years of the sixteenth century. The humanist Alvar Gómez de Castro in a manuscript volume of his *Miscellanea* quotes fairly accurately thirty lines from the *Libro de Buen Amor* interspersed among stanzas 766-829.¹⁹ Unfortunately he does not mention the name of the author or the work from which he is quoting; he probably knew neither.

11. *Argote de Molina.*

In this same general period another reference to our Archpriest comes to light. We can be practically sure that the historian and

¹⁷ Op. cit., Sánchez, p. 311; Simpson, p. 227.

¹⁸ *Proemio é Carta al Condestable de Portugal*, in Menéndez y Pelayo, *Antología de Poetas Líricos Castellanos*, in *Biblioteca Clásica*, v (Madrid, 1927), 24.

¹⁹ F. J. Sánchez Cantón, "Siete versos inéditos del *Libro de Buen Amor*," *Revista de Filología Española*, v (1918), 43-45; L. G. Moffatt, "Alvar Gómez de Castro's Verses from the *Libro de Buen Amor*," *Hispanic Review*, xxv (1957), 247-251.

genealogist Argote de Molina (1515-1580) possessed in some form a copy of his *Libro* by this notation in the inventory of his library: "Cancionero del Arcipreste, de canciones antiquissimas de tiempo del Rey Don Alonso XI."²⁰ It is probably from this manuscript that Argote copied in his *Elogios* the jumbled verses from a *serrana* of the Archpriest which he falsely attributed to a certain Domingo Abad de los Romances, a thirteenth century minstrel attached to the court of Alfonso X at Seville.²¹ These same verses were quoted, following Argote, by Diego Ortiz de Zúñiga in 1647 who in all good faith accepted Argote's attribution of authorship.²² Argote's knowledge of the *Libro de Buen Amor* or its author must have been nil, for besides this incident, he makes no mention of either in his *Discurso sobre la Poesía Castellana* which precedes his edition of the *Conde Lucanor*.

12. Torres' History of Guadalajara.

Again there is a blank for almost another century, until the time of the *Historia de la muy noblissima Ciudad de Guadaluza* (still in manuscript in the Biblioteca Nacional of Madrid) written by Francisco de Torres in 1646. One section of this work is devoted to the famous men produced by Guadalajara—clerics, authors, soldiers, statesmen, etc. In this catalogue of names, we read on folio 357: "El Arcipreste de Hita (que no he savido asta aora mas nombre suyo) hizo un gran volumen de provervios en verso." On the margin just opposite this item, in another hand, there is written: "dedicolos al infante d. Pedro, Condestabre de Portugal." There is also another manuscript edition of this work, written at the same time and arranged slightly differently. Under the caption *Poettas* we read this item: "El Arcipreste de Hita hizo un gran volumen de provervios en verso," with no marginal annotation. In neither manuscript is there any mention of date, proper name, or title of work. Tomás Antonio Sánchez comments on this item thusly: "no se hace creíble lo que dice don Francisco de Torres en su *Historia* (manuscrita) de *Guadalajara*, esto es, que vivía [el Arcipreste] en aquella ciudad, entonces villa, el año de 1415, à no ser que haya equivocación por 1315, en que ciertamente vivía y podía ser poeta joven," and, "Esto se puede com-

²⁰ Augustín Millares Carlo, "La Biblioteca de Gonzalo Argote de Molina," *Revista de Filología Española*, x (1923), 145.

²¹ Dámaso Alonso, "Crítica de noticias literarias transmitidas por Argote," *Boletín de la Real Academia Española*, xxxviii (Jan.-April, 1957), 63-81.

²² Diego Ortiz de Zúñiga, *Anales Eclesiásticos de la muy noble y muy leal ciudad de Sevilla* (Madrid, 1795), I, 196-197.

probar con lo que dice el mismo Torres en la citada historia, conviene à saber: que eran contemporáneos el Arcipreste y el poeta Alonso González de Castro. Y habiendo sido éste algo tiempo coetáneo del arcediano de Toro, que floreció en el reinado de Juan el Primero, se colige que nuestro Arcipreste y Alonso de Castro lo fueron también por los años de 1315.”²³

There is a good deal of confusion, and even error, in Sánchez' comments. In the first place, no date is given for the Archpriest by Torres. It is true that just below his name, we find: “Alonso González de Castro floreció en sus poesías por los años de 1425,” but the names are not arranged chronologically, and the Archpriest and Castro find themselves together here just by chance juxtaposition. What Sánchez has done apparently is to confuse Torres' statement with some in the *Proemio* of the Marqués de Santillana. In this work we read: “Alfonso Gonzalez de Castro, natural desta villa de Guadalfaxara dixo bien é fizo estas canciones . . . ,”²⁴ and a little later he mentions the Arcediano de Toro “en tiempo de rey Don Johan.”²⁵

To summarize: In the text proper of the *Libro de Buen Amor*, the author names himself “Archpriest of Hita” in eight unquestioned passages. In one instance he refers to himself as “Fyta.” We have ruled out the reference to Alcalá as possessing no biographical value.²⁶ In two places he refers to himself as “Juan Ruiz, Archpriest of Hita,” but the second of these is in a quite possibly spurious verse, and the first one is highly suspect. Could it be that the scribe of the earliest manuscript we possess (Ms. G, 1389), writing some 45 years after the completion of the *Libro* (1343) did not know the personal name of the author, and on his own account gave him a “John Doe” appellation, for “Juan Ruiz” is a name of that type? As noted, the *explicits* of the manuscripts offer us no name. *These two cases are the only ones in the whole literature by or about the Archpriest by his near contemporaries which mention the name “Juan Ruiz.”* (Excluded

²³ Tomás Antonio Sánchez, *Poetas Castellanos Anteriores al Siglo XV*, p. xxxiii.

²⁴ Marqués de Santillana, *Proemio etc.*, p. 26.

²⁵ As a footnote of some interest, we append a statement of Juan Catalina García-López, *Biblioteca de Escritores de la Provincia de Guadalajara* (Madrid, 1899), pp. ix-xi. He states that his purpose is to make known “escritores nacidos en la Provincia de Guadalajara,” excluding those whose Alcarreño origin is not well proved. “Así, he says, “aparté . . . al Arcipreste de Hita, no obstante haber residido casi siempre en la Alcarria y constar que murió y fué enterrado en la capital.” What a pity that he did not give his authority for the statement concerning the Archpriest's death and burial in Guadalajara!

²⁶ Félix Lecoy, *Recherches sur le Libro de Buen Amor de Juan Ruiz* (Paris, 1938), p. 331: “la preuve [of verse 1510, a] est sans valeur.”

is the colophon of Ms. S, the latest of the manuscripts—C. 1400—because the information or misinformation it contains was manufactured by the scribe from dubious deductions from the text he had just copied.) The rubrics of Ms. S have only “Arçipreste.”

The earliest external documentary sources, the Gil de Albornoz items, prove on close examination to have much less value for establishing data on the name or life of the Archpriest than some authorities have assigned to them, notably Sánchez and Cejador.²⁷ The first one, that of June 16, 1350, simply proves that on said date Albornoz did not know if there was a regular archpriest at Hita, or, if not, what the name of the “acting” archpriest was; the second shows that on January 7, 1351, the name of the archpriest of Hita was Pedro Fernández. If the author of the *Libro de Buen Amor* was archpriest of Hita when he made the first redaction of his work (1330), and he so names himself in it, and was still archpriest there on June 16, 1350, it seems that his bishop would certainly have known his name. If, on the other hand, Don Gil had incarcerated the author of the *Libro* in 1339, as has been put forward with scanty and unconvincing evidence,²⁸ he would certainly have replaced him in his episcopal functions in this interval of eleven years. And if an archpriest of Hita had died or been deposed shortly before June 16, 1350, Don Gil would have known it, and would also have known whether he had made an appointment to that post. Why then does he know the name of the Archpriest of Hita on January 7, 1351, when writing from faraway Avignon and apparently does not know it on June 16, 1350 when he found himself at nearby San Blas de Villaviciosa? The explanation is, I think, simple enough: on June 16, 1350, he wants to send some instructions to the archpriest of Hita, and so begins to dictate to his secretary “to the Archpriest of Hita,” but then recalls that there is none, the position having recently become vacant for some reason unknown to us, and adds, logically enough—“or to his *locum tenens*.” But this situation no longer exists on January 7, 1351, as he had filled the post before leaving Spain in the autumn of 1350 and he is thus able to designate the addressee by name on two occasions. At any rate, these documents shed no light on the name or career of our poet, except in a negative sense—he was not archpriest of Hita on or after June 16, 1350, whenever he may have been.

²⁷ Lecoy, *Recherches*, etc., pp. 330-331, n. 2.

²⁸ Cejador y Frauca, *Juan Ruiz*, etc., pp. 121-122. Damásio Alonso, “La Cárcel del Arcipreste,” in *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, LXXXVI, 156-175, and cf. Moffatt, art. cit., *Hispania*, xxxiii (1950).

It is to be noted that outside the *Libro de Buen Amor*, not a single document mentions our author except as the Archpriest of Hita," or simply "Archpriest." His personal name seems totally unknown to his contemporaries or near contemporaries.

Certain conclusions concerning his literary reputation can be drawn from these documents. His work was highly popular until about the middle of the fifteenth century (the Portuguese translation, a copy of his work in the library of King Duarte, the reference to it in the *Cancioneiro de Baena*, his place in the repertoire of the wandering minstrel, its influence on the *Corbacho*.) But the influence of the new, more refined and learned type of poetry coming to be in vogue among the educated classes quickly causes him to be neglected and almost forgotten, so that the Marqués de Santillana around 1450 can only say of him that *even* he wrote in varied metric forms. No doubt his popularity continued longer among the people gathered in the market-place to listen to a vagabond *juglar*, and this would have pleased him, witness his words: "fablévos en jograría" (1633, b.).

After the time of the Marqués de Santillana the Archpriest becomes only a name, and the writers who mention him by chance know nothing of him or his work. Thus Gómez de Castro, about the middle of the sixteenth century, will quote some of his lines without apparently knowing the author or the book from which they were taken. Thus Argote de Molina, a little later, will possess a work, which we suppose to be our author's, only under the title of "Cancioneiro del Arcipreste, de canciones antiquissimas . . .," and will attribute, knowingly or not, a *serrana* of his to a thirteenth century unknown, to be followed in this later by another historian, Ortiz de Zúñiga. Thus a scholar of Guadalajara writing in the mid-seventeenth century to extol the glories of his province must say that the only name he can find for him is "Arcipreste de Hita," and that he wrote a big book of proverbs!

Unfortunately these documents give us still less information about the man, except that he was archpriest of Hita and must have died somewhere around the middle of the fourteenth century. Indeed one has some justification for doubting that his name was really Juan Ruiz. Truly he lives for us only in his *Libro de Buen Amor*, and even the title is modern,²⁹ but in this he will live immortally as the

²⁹ R. Menéndez Pidal, "Título que el Arcipreste de Hita dió al libro de sus poesías," *Revista de Archivos* (Madrid, 1908), p. 106 (reprinted in his *Poesía árabe y poesía europea* in the *Colección Austral*).

greatest poet of medieval Spain and one of the three or four greatest poets of all medieval Europe.

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A Source of *Le Paysan parvenu*

Marivaux's journalistic writings not only throw light on him as a theorist and moralist; they also sketch characters developed fully in the plays and novels. The latter aspect suggests that his characters, once created, had for Marivaux a semi-autonomous existence and that they remained with him until, like Pirandello, he was able to embody their problems in an appropriate form. Among the various instances of preliminary creation, there is one upon which, to my knowledge, literary historians have not touched, except for two rapid allusions by Fournier and Bastide.¹ The particular example is found in *Le Chemin de la fortune*, which appeared in the third and fourth issues of *Le Cabinet du philosophe* (i. e., January or February 1734) and to which *Le Paysan parvenu* bears definite affinities. Since the first part of the latter work was published in May 1734, the very proximity of date offers prima facie probability of the filiation.²

Le Chemin de la fortune: ou Le Saut du fossé is an allegorical comedy, a genre of which Marivaux was fond. The play, which stops abruptly after the eighth scene, consists of two parts. The first (scenes i-iii) presents the general terms of the moral issue. In scene i, Lucidor, an "honnête homme" in dire straits, as his dress attests, and La Verduze, a liveried servant, arrive in the kingdom of the goddess Fortune. They attain their coveted goal not without dismay, for between them and Fortune's palace lies a moat bordered by the tombs of virtues which, as they will learn, have to be cast off to enter the palace. Shall Lucidor and La Verduze cross the moat? To argue the pros and cons, Le Scrupule and La Cupidité appear in consecutive scenes (ii and iii), and their harangues leave the two fortune hunters in varying degrees of indecision. In a final effort to convince them,

¹ Marivaux, *Théâtre complet*, eds. Jean Fournier and Maurice Bastide (Paris: Editions Nationales, 1947), II, 149, col. 1, 154, n. 2.

² For the source of these dates, see Frédéric Deloffre, *Une Préciosité nouvelle: Marivaux et le marivaudage*, *Annales de l'Université de Lyon*, troisième série, Lettres, fascicule 27 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1955), pp. 530-533.

Cupidity suggests they participate in an audience about to be granted by Fortune to several people, "poltrons comme vous qui refusent de sauter."³ The remaining scenes (iv-viii) detail in unrelated fashion the interviews of five people who all bear resemblances to characters of *Le Paysan parvenu*.

The first to be admitted before Fortune is Clarice, "veuve d'un des plus honnêtes hommes du monde" (iv, p. 1071). Fearful of her honor, she has come to ask the goddess for a husband. Although she has many suitors, unfortunately, their interests are extra-marital. As she says, "ils ne sont qu'amoureux et point tendres" (p. 1071). Clarice foreshadows Mme de Dorville. Like Clarice's late husband, M. de Dorville is of irreproachable merit. Though he is still alive, he is suffering from a fatal illness and Jacob observes that his wife "sera bientôt veuve."⁴ The introduction of Mme de Dorville is a late development in the novel, since she briefly appears, first, toward the end of the fourth part, and, once more, in the same place of the fifth and final part. Under these circumstances, one can only advance conjectures on the rôle she was destined to play. It is safe to assume, however, that her widowhood and consequent exposure to gallantries were to be central considerations. Inasmuch as Jacob and the comte de Dorsan display, by the end of the fifth part, clear interest in this woman, may we not conclude that Marivaux intended one or both suitors, like Clarice's, to be "amoureux et point tendres"? The apocryphal Part VI introduces a different but parallel situation. There M. de Fécur, the financier, reveals to Jacob that he has improper designs on the future widow.⁵ In thus developing M. de Fécur, the unknown continuator was drawing a logical conclusion from the character of this man and the Clarice-like situation of Mme de Dorville.

Another person to appear before the goddess is the unforgettable M. Rondelet (vi). Characteristic is his arrival at Fortune's audience: he stumbles upon it, for he was simply passing by. "C'est que je suis sans façon," M. Rondelet says (p. 1074); he proceeds to confirm this by his unconcerned familiarity of speech and gesture. M. Rondelet might also have added that he was without strong moral con-

³ *Théâtre complet*, ed. Marcel Arland, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade no. 79 (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), p. 1070. All future references will be to this edition.

⁴ *Le Paysan parvenu*, in *Romans*, ed. Marcel Arland, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade no. 78 (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 780. Except as otherwise specified, all future references will be to this edition.

⁵ *Le Paysan parvenu*, ed. Duviquet, Bibliothèque Amusante no. 8 (Paris, n.d.), pp. 408, 411-413.

victions. Having no virtues to lose, he is the only suppliant to leap the moat successfully. However, there is nothing sinister about him. His whole being breathes an engaging, if obtuse, "bonhomie."

What immediately strikes the reader is the similarity between him and the financier, M. Bono. The similarity is first of all physical. Jacob describes M. Bono as "ce gros et petit homme" (p. 741), two qualities that are implicit in the name Rondelet. Like M. Rondelet, M. Bono is also "sans façon," for he receives Mme de Dorville, her mother, and Jacob with a toothpick in his hand. Rondelet and Bono even speak alike. In his portrait of the latter, Jacob says that he had "la parole si rapide que, de quatre mots qu'il disait, il en culbutait la moitié" (p. 743). In fact, the speeches of M. Bono consist of a series of short clauses which follow each other with a dizzying, staccato rhythm. One notices the same pattern in Rondelet's words, as in his reply to the rebuke by Fortune's "suivante" that he had not sufficiently bowed before her mistress: "J'en ai fait plus de trois [révérences]; mais c'est que je les tire un peu courtes: c'est ce qui fait qu'elles ne paraissent rien. Tenez, en voilà encore une, et puis deux, et puis des compliments. Bonjour, mes enfants, serviteur très humble. Comment vous portez-vous? dites-moi que vous vous portez bien, je dirai que j'en suis bien aise; et puis voilà qui est fini" (pp. 1074-75).

There is one important difference. M. Rondelet has just entered the palace of Fortune; M. Bono is already wealthy. Therefore, the latter can indulge in the kind acts of which the former is only potentially capable. Indeed, their names suggest this distinction, for Rondelet stresses the external, the physical, and Bono the moral aspect of the same limited, but good character.*

M. Rondelet is succeeded by Hermidas, the "bel esprit," who seeks permission to dedicate his book to Fortune (vii). Hermidas represents a type to which Marivaux was particularly antipathetic. Once before, in *L'Île de la raison* (1727), Marivaux took this group to task in the person of the "poète," who, with the "philosophe," proved incapable of regaining his reason because of his unnaturalness, fatuity, and maliciousness. Hermidas, embodying the same failings, anticipates the young author who shares the carriage to Versailles with Jacob and two other travelers. This time, the resemblance is more

* The good financier is a rarity in Marivaux's works, the only other striking example being Richard of the comedy, *Le Triomphe de Plutus* (1728). To find two examples so close in time is further evidence of their relationship.

tenuous. Hermidas is a generality, whereas the young author represents a particular person, Crébillon fils, who had parodied Marivaux's style in *Tanzaï et Néadarné* (1734). Marivaux was offering in return a criticism of his competitor's newest book, but in portraying the character of the young man he used much more moderation than in the case of Hermidas. Nevertheless, in two respects the young author brings to mind Hermidas: he is going to Versailles to retrieve a copy of his book which he lent to a "seigneur" evidently in an effort to seek patronage; the old officer, Marivaux's "porte-parole," criticizes the young man's "bel esprit." If nothing more, then, Hermidas offered Marivaux a means by which to criticize Crébillon fils.

The evidence of a relationship between *Le Chemin de la fortune* and *Le Paysan parvenu* becomes even more conclusive in the case of La Verduze who resembles Jacob, the "paysan parvenu." When La Verduze is admitted before Fortune (v), he confesses that he already has the opportunity to enrich himself. His employer, a financier, has offered him the hand of Lisette, a former "femme de chambre," but the servant is unwilling since he is not particularly attracted to "les veuves dont le mari vit encore" (p. 1074). This is precisely the first event in the career of Jacob whom the "seigneur du village," a financier, asks to marry his mistress, Geneviève, a "femme de chambre" also in his employ.

The parallel goes beyond an exact correspondence of situation, for Marivaux partially modeled the conversation between Jacob and his "seigneur" on elements of scenes involving La Verduze in *Le Chemin de la fortune*. After an exchange of pleasant small talk, Jacob's master broaches the true subject and makes the projected union extremely attractive by promises of money, a furnished home for which he will pay, lucrative employment in the future, and his protection. La Verduze's speech to Fortune, in which he reports blandishments of the financier, already contains the essence of these details: "[Mon maître m'a dit] qu'il me donnera des emplois; qu'il me fera riche si je veux épouser Lisette, ci-devant une petite femme de chambre extrêmement jolie, tout à fait mignonne vraiment et parfaitement nippée. Ce serait ma foi un bon petit ménage tout dressé" (p. 1074).

When Jacob hears his master's offer, he pauses to reflect. His reflections assume the form of an inner discourse among honor, cupidity, and Jacob himself, which brings immediately to mind the successive scenes of *Le Scrupule* and *La Cupidité* (ii-iii). To be sure, there are differences. In the play, the abstractions are arguing

generalities; in the novel, they are dealing with the specific issue of marriage to a kept woman. Consequently, although the tone and framework are the same, the terms of the conversation are not. *Le Scrupule* has become *Honor*, but already in the play the former exhorted *La Verdu* and *Lucidor* to follow "le chemin de l'Honneur" (ii, p. 1067).

As a result of his reflections, Jacob states that he cannot marry *Geneviève*, given his reluctance to share a "ménage à trois." Thereupon, the "seigneur" drops the mask of propriety he has maintained to cover his relations with the maid and baldly defends ambiguous marriages in the name of financial success, the only ideal worth having. Since Jacob continues to refuse, his master, in a fit of anger, offers him the alternative of marriage or prison. For both the cynical defense of wealth and the final ultimatum there is no counterpart in *Le Chemin*. *La Verdu* and his employer have not yet had a frank discussion of the offer, and, as a result, the conversation cannot reach the critical, and more dramatic, stage at which it ends in *Le Paysan parvenu*.

There is also a resemblance in character between *La Verdu* and the young Jacob, recently arrived from Champagne: they both possess a lively, plebeian wit well seasoned with "l'humeur gaillarde." It would be inaccurate, however, to assume a complete coincidence between the two. For one thing, *La Verdu* is in livery, while, even when a servant, Jacob wears a suit of solid color. This distinction is symptomatic of a much profounder difference. *La Verdu* is an orphan of dubious origin; Jacob is the offspring of modest, but respectable parents. Since Jacob is destined to reach the heights of wealth and consideration, illegitimacy, to be expected in a liveried domestic recruited from the lowest class of society, would have been too great a handicap for him. These considerations on birth crop up at crucial points several times in the novel. For example, when *Mlle Habert* the younger confides to Jacob that he is the husband she has been seeking, she is careful to add the following restriction: "Je n'étais pas délicate non plus sur l'origine [i. e., of her ideal husband], pourvu qu'elle fût honnête; c'est-à-dire pourvu qu'elle ne fût qu'obscure, et non pas vile et méprisable" (p. 644). It is, moreover, difficult to see why a bastard, such as *La Verdu*, would object to an improper marriage to a *Lisette*, or a *Geneviève*. Not so with Jacob who has a certain family honor to maintain, as he informs his "seigneur": "Ma mère se maria fille, sa grand'mère en avait fait

autant, et de grand'mère en grand'mère, je suis venu droit comme vous voyez, avec l'obligation de ne rien changer à cela" (p. 588).

If Jacob's birth separates him from La Verduce, it brings him close to Lucidor whose only distinguishing feature is his "honnêteté." In selecting a model for Jacob, Marivaux had no choice; in comparison with La Verduce, Lucidor seems completely colorless. However, Lucidor does not disappear in favor of the more forceful servant; he is, rather, *absorbed* by him.⁷ Such a conclusion finds hypothetical support in the brief eighth and final scene of *Le Chemin* which is devoted to this "honnête homme." After Lucidor declines to leap the moat, the "suivante" says to him in the last speech of the play: "Mais tenez, voici le Grand-Prêtre de la Déesse: remettez-vous entre ses mains. Il va vous débarrasser de vos scrupules par la plus petite opération du monde" (p. 1078). Even though further proof is lacking, may we not reasonably identify Jacob's "seigneur du village" with Fortune's High Priest and his cynical pronouncement on the importance of wealth (for which no counterpart exists in those sections of the play concerning La Verduce) with the small operation designed to eliminate scruples?

The contributions of *Le Chemin de la fortune* to *Le Paysan parvenu* are clear. The play offers the main traits of the principal character and three secondary ones.⁸ It also contains the Geneviève episode, the starting point of the novel's action. Even more important, the allegorical comedy indicates, finally, the direction in which the novel will develop. Aided by chance (i.e., the opportune death of the "seigneur"), Jacob was able to refuse the hand of Geneviève; that is to say, he did not leap the moat. Instead, in accord with the recommendation of *Le Scrupule* to La Verduce and Lucidor (ii), he chose to follow the "chemin de l'Honneur," a difficult and much longer road. Having now "arrived," Jacob can look back with satisfaction and relate with pleasure the "arduous" steps of his progress, the details of which, despite Marivaux's moral intentions, are disturbingly equivocal to the modern reader.

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⁷ In her thesis, *Marivaux: A Study in Sensibility* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1941), Mrs. Ruth Kirby Jamieson proved that by a progressive education in sensibility Jacob changes in the course of the novel. Ideally, La Verduce and Lucidor would represent the two terms of this development.

⁸ As further proof of their origin in *Le Chemin*, it should be noted that all three secondary figures are introduced in relation to a common episode: Jacob's trip to Versailles. It is as though Marivaux found it impossible to separate them.

REVIEWS

Paul F. Baum, *Chaucer: A Critical Appreciation* (Durham, N. C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1958. xi + 229 pp. \$6.00). THIS is a book

written with malice toward all and with charity for almost none. It escapes from the conventional series of chapters based on something like the chronological order of the poet's works. It attacks its subject, first with an exposure of the dubious critical methods of various scholars, then with a study of special problems in the technique of some of the *Canterbury Tales*, then with a vigorous re-examination of the question of the *Troilus* and its Epilogue, next with a general discussion of the art of Chaucer, and finally with some concluding remarks. If one did not know that Mr. Baum is a sensitive critic, he would here discover the fact in the delicate analysis of the *Prioress' Tale* (which Mr. Baum apparently reads only with a modern person's understanding) as a story told with a "precarious ambiguity . . . which matches the reverent raillery of our first introduction to the Prioress" (p. 79). But apart from this and certain other perhaps less remarkable achievements in the book, one is bound to suspect that in this volume all is not well. The author has been reading a lot of Chaucer criticism, and he does not like it. From time to time in the discussion, in a way that suggests prejudice roaming at large, a note of petulance is heard that seems out of harmony with Mr. Baum's insight and skill. For this the Preface furnishes an explanation: "It has come now to seem disloyal to hint a fault in 'our incomparable poet': for if anything in his poetry appeared irregular or unsatisfactory we have studiously overlooked it or hurried to his defense with ingenious contrivances of interpretation. . . ." (p. vii).

Apparently his patience at last gave out when he read Mr. Bennett's recent book on the *Parlement of Foules*, of which he presents an estimate marked with what Chaucer might have called "sturdiness" in a way that, I am afraid, may be considered grossly unfair. After touching on certain matters in the life of Chaucer, Mr. Baum goes after the scholars and their ideas about the Pardoner (as a sample) quoting them, comparing and commenting on them.¹ The point is

¹ As one who has suffered here the reviewer may point out an instance of

that he resents as gratuitous the interpretations of this and various other Chaucer characters, as if the proper reader must make no creative addition in his reading but, in general, hold his imagination in restraint. For example when Professor Lumiansky offers a conjecture as to why the Pardoner joined the pilgrimage Mr. Baum says: "... of course the Pardoner had no choice in the matter; he is there because Chaucer put him there . . ." (p. 57). Further along in the book he says: Chaucer's "characters are not psychological constructs or complexly consistent artistic creations, but more or less lively simulacra performing their functions predetermined by the plot" (p. 113). Thus Criseyde "suffers from her heredity—Benoit and Boccaccio—and she also has to obey the plot" (p. 35). As if, we may observe, Chaucer and other writers did not again and again feel free to change the plot to fit a complete change in one or more of the characters; as indeed we must notice with regard to Criseyde herself.

What sort of literary criticism remains possible under the circumstances indicated by Mr. Baum raises interesting questions. Perhaps on the whole it is better to err on the side of fulsome interpretation of the characters, to add an abundance of those "gratuities" to which Mr. Baum objects, rather than to miss the merits of an important writer or understate the powers he displays. This is especially true in dealing with a poet of the first or second magnitude, concerning whom it would be sheer nonsense "to write him down as a mere entertainer" (p. x), though Mr. Baum seems at times to come pretty close to such a degradation of Chaucer. For example he says "we cannot safely overlook his historical position, which gave him little incentive to exceed his grasp, or to forget the first audience for which he wrote, an audience which, enveloped as he was in social and political confusions and wishing mainly to be entertained, was easily satisfied with what it could easily understand and would not greatly care for political, religious, or philosophical increments" (pp. x-xi). Quite so, and therefore these elements in his verse are all the more significant. One must not forget that Chaucer studied the *Consolation of Philosophy* as quoted in the *Roman de la Rose*; that he was led by his interest to make his own translation, using the Latin, the

Mr. Baum's arbitrary misinterpretation of his material. The "insinuation" in Chaucer's account of the Summoner and the Pardoner hardly comes from the Pardoner or makes him flaunt his own weakness. As for "gentle Chaucer" one must not forget what the Pardoner has to say about "holinesse"—and there are lines in the *Merchant's Tale* and elsewhere that suggest the poet's harshness in condemnation of a character.

French version, and a commentary. He also spent some time on the story of Melibeus and the material of the Parson's Tale. He also worked out his own idea of the Goddess Fortuna (his use is not merely "traditional") with a closely knit account of her that borrows from Boethius and Dante. This material he used, among other places, at two extremely important moments in the plot of the *Troilus*. He worked carefully also in his composition of the prayers to Our Lady in the prologue of the *Prioress' Tale* and that of the *Second Nun's Tale*. These intricate compositions show that he was taking pains to achieve the best expression for his material; and in each case it is an expression of a religious, indeed a spiritual quality. The same is true with regard to the Epilogue of the *Troilus*, which Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch cited as an example of "high seriousness" in the poet, and indeed from which he quoted in the Oxford Book of English Verse.

Modern criticism is not always fair to those values in medieval literature which seem perhaps foreign to our age. In much that is written today I seem to see a new figure of the poet emerging, the figure of what I must call "the meager Chaucer." This is a writer who is court entertainer and that is really about all. In his work we discover that he was indifferent to inconsistencies and errors, for all that he cares about is a laugh. His comedy in general "is bright; it does not penetrate the depths." His longer works come apart: the *Parlement* at the beginning of the dream (for which the *Somnium Scipionis* has of course no significance). The *Troilus* breaks asunder at the Epilogue, which shows a different mood from the rest and really contradicts what has gone before (of course to see things this way you must give superficial consideration to Chaucer's treatment of the idea of love, and above all throw out the passages that refer to sin—or you will have a tragedy on your hands worthy of the attention of Aristotle). The Epilogue a matter of "a pious platitude" and the soliloquy on predestination (a blemish if ever there was one—if your sense of humor is a bit impoverished) show how little the poet cared about philosophy or morality: he was "not greatly concerned with spiritual values or the mysteries of the soul." What the poet cared about in the *Troilus* was the union of the lovers. And *Troilus* is the perfect lover (though Pandarus has to do nearly everything for him; and both he and Criseyde at crucial times tell the young hero to be a man). The last two books of the poem are a boredom of pathos. For Chaucer himself seems to show "that detachment and

amoral attitude that refuses to be embroiled in moral judgments." The *Monk's Tale* does not suit the Monk. The Clerk's Envoy does not suit the Clerk. The *Parson's Tale* shows the poet's real lack of sincerity, already exposed in various ways in the Epilogue of the *Troilus*, the story of Constance, and of course the legends of the little Clergeoun and St. Cecilia.

But why go on? The modern may have this "meager Chaucer" if he likes; it comes cheap. All you have to do is to ignore what is inconsistent with this shallow deformed creature. In any case how can the poet have moral or artistic integrity if he is at heart a fatalist whose characters are all subject to the sway of fate or fortune or "in some sense the divine will" and yet a writer who bids his readers to lift their hearts in prayer? In the fourteenth century, it is true, both fate (or the equivalent) and free will were a part of orthodoxy, as one can see in literature from St. Augustine and Boethius and Dante down to our own day with the *World, the Flesh, and Father Smith*. But all you have to do with such a fact as this is to call it a "subtle evasion," and the poet is back where you want him in a sea of sentimentalism. Is this just a bit less than intellectually honest? Well—it is one way of not facing what is uncomfortable; in dealing with the thought of the period it is the modern critic's subtle evasion at all events. But Chaucer speaks with clarity on this subject, we notice, and what he says is also implicit in his works. However, he is indifferent to inconsistency, we are told. And it is astonishing how well the meager Chaucer suits the confusion and meaningless disorder of the modern world, almost as if distinctively modern critics had made him in their own image.

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HOWARD R. PATCH

Geoffrey Tillotson, *Pope and Human Nature* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. viii + 278 pp. \$4.00). UNDER the skin of every major poet lurk, like Hyde and Jekyll, a shifty-eyed, bomb-toting subversive given to scrawling obscenities on the walls of public buildings, and a smooth-shaven, plausible-sounding Official Spokesman of All the Best Received Ideas. There is the Chaucer of the *Miller's Tale* and the Chaucer of *Melibeus*; the *Falstaff-Iago-Thersites* Shakespeare and the *Prospero-Shakespeare* who lectures at *Miranda*;

the young revolutionary bastard-begetting Wordsworth and the old half-witted sheep Wordsworth; the Sturm-und-Drang Eliot of Sweeney Agonistes and the quatrain poems, and the "as-we-get-older-we-do-not-get-any-younger" Eliot snapped by the candid kodak of Henry Reed's parody.

Of the two Popes, Pope-id and Pope-superego, Geoffrey Tillotson, distinguished editor of the Twickenham *Rape*, clearly prefers the latter. Four-fifths of his *Poetry of Pope* (1936; rev. 1950) was devoted to analysing the "correctness" of Pope's versification—what the poet meant when he said that "Mr. Walsh . . . used to encourage me much, and used to tell me, that there was one way left of excelling: for though we had several great poets, we never had any one great poet that was correct; and he desired me to make that my study and aim." Now in his second book on the poet, *Pope and Human Nature*, a study of subject-matter rather than versification, it is the Pope of "jubilant obviousness" (p. 186) that Mr. Tillotson celebrates, the "complete literary personality" of "august stature" (p. 156) and "loud uplifted trumpets" (p. 158), the avatar of "Natural feeling as it is represented in the wisdom of Solomon" (p. 59). Though some poems seem to fit such specifications better than others—for this critic the *Essay on Man* is Pope's most "gloriously exciting" work (p. 42), *The Dunciad* a poem he wrote "for himself" (p. 68)—nevertheless Mr. Tillotson's Pope remains generally true to the ideals of his age; and "the typical eighteenth-century poet," writes Mr. Tillotson, "believed that men read poetry to discover . . . that they were like their fellows, or to remind them of themselves. . . . Nature made for social solidarity. It formed the heart of that social thing literature. . . . We of the twentieth century still see the force of all this" (p. 9).

Does such a belief entail some risks of platitudinizing? For Mr. Tillotson, platitudes don't endanger art, they are its source of strength: "Mortals are blind to Fate, but they could guess what was coming if they troubled to. . . . Then they would see that life is ups and downs, which is what the poets have been saying from the start" (p. 47). Did Pope scrawl up a few obscenities in his time?—no matter! "Pope's attitude to the indecencies he made use of carries the approval of the common reader. . . . Reading his poems, we side with him as with what we sometimes call a normal man, as we do not when we read the writings of, say, Swinburne or D. H. Lawrence" (p. 117). Solidarity, normalcy—these are the qualities

that in Mr. Tillotson's opinion recommend Pope to his admirers as surely as their absence damages the mere sensation-seeking or eccentricity-mongering of lesser authors: "We cannot be expected to be much interested, for example, in a novel of Wilkie Collins that takes for main characters a deaf-mute person and a blind person" (p. 120).

There are, I think, two main troubles with such an approach to Pope as this book offers. First, Mr. Tillotson's Pope comes out so solid, so normal, as to risk defeating the ends which the book proposes. Better the "maniacal denigrations" (*Poetry of Pope*, p. 32) of the Rev. Whitwell Elwin, some readers are going to exclaim—better even Lytton Strachey's notorious image of a rooftop monkey ladling boiling lead upon innocent passersby—better these than a thorough-going, two-hundred-and-fifty-page defence of Pope on the grounds of his sound general principles, firm morality, and commitment to doctrines (see pp. 85-92) like "handsome is as handsome does." Will not such arguments, in many eyes, create more readers for Wilkie Collins, Swinburne, D. H. Lawrence, and Joyce's *Ulysses* ("unfortunately the less acceptable because of a false sophistication," p. 10), than for the real subject of this study? For, as Mr. Tillotson himself points out, citing the authority of Charles Reade, "People find no pleasure in proving an accused person innocent; the charm is to detect guilt" (p. 219). In short, if we must have Melibeus, let it be redeemed by the Miller's Tale; if we must endure Jekyll, let him be redeemed by Hyde.

The second trouble with this book's approach is that many of the topics Mr. Tillotson treats are so broad, loose, and miscellaneous that they fail to give scope to his very real talents as editor and analyst of Pope's poetry. Chapter I is on "Nature," and the concrete examples given of this idea are as follows: (1) man's mortality, (2) the value of friendship, (3) the saying "all men lie," (4) the idea that societies differ more than do human physiques, (5) the popularity of rime, (6) patriotism, (7) rules for gardening, (8) the advisability of serving refreshments at social gatherings, (9) man's hope for a future life, and (10) the universality of the practice of poetry. Out of such materials a systematic approach to Pope—like Lewis's to Milton in *A Preface to Paradise Lost* or Tillyard's to Shakespeare in *The Elizabethan World Picture*—does not readily emerge.

Moreover, the very breadth of the topics seems often to inhibit detailed discussion of the poetry. On page 139, for example, a seventy-line extract from the "Epistle to Augustus" is followed by the com-

ment that "Men's debt to poets has been stated often but never placed so low as in passages like this." But the tone of the passage is exceedingly complicated, shifting, in part, from ironic deprecation ("What will a child learn sooner than a song?") to sudden overt hostility ("Unless he praise some monster of a King") to reserved moralizing ("Roscommon only boasts unspotted Bays") to tribute and hostility combined ("The Rights a Court attack'd, a Poet sav'd") and back to ironic deprecation again ("Hopkins and Sternhold glad the heart with Psalms")—all of which various contours the critic's single comment flattens out like a steamroller.

It is only fair to add that such flattening is anything but characteristic of Mr. Tillotson at his best. He has a good ear, he has read widely in Augustan poetry, and he genuinely enjoys—when he gives himself the opportunity—tinkering with the minutiae of Popean couplets and verse paragraphs. His book on Pope's correctness ranks with one or two essays of Leavis, certain pages in *The Seven Types of Ambiguity*, and Maynard Mack's study of Pope's imagery as among the documents that have most contributed to an intelligent reading of Pope in the twentieth century. And in Chapter X of *Pope and Human Nature* when he comments on imperfect rimes, on the spelling of proper names in "Kubla Khan," on the way the syntax of the Atticus portrait "allows the sense to edge forward, as if a snake were jerking up to within striking distance," on the line "But liv'd, in Settle's numbers, one day more," or (a very fine passage) on the transitions, structure, and content of the "Epistle to Miss Blount," he seems to me to be writing at the top of his form as an analyst of Pope. It is a pity that such passages, in which the author, grappling with precise literary details, shows his own strength, are relatively infrequent in this disappointing book; for, as a modern poet somewhere puts it, the spirit killeth, but the letter giveth life.

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WILLIAM FROST

Bernice Slote, *Keats and the Dramatic Principle* (Lincoln, Nebraska: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1958. vii + 229 pp. \$4.50). UNTIL quite recently, Keats's poetry has never really undergone any stringent analysis. We have had, for the most part, to be content with Wordsworth's summation of the hymn to Pan as a "pretty piece of paganism," or with Arnold's moral insistence that the final lines of the "Ode on

a Grecian Urn" embody only a partial truth, or with T. S. Eliot's unhappiness about *Hyperion* ("it contains great lines, but I do not know whether it is a great poem"). Despite the anti-romanticism of the past few decades, however, there have been a number of recrudescences of Keats. There is now the Croceian Keats of A. E. Powell, the Hegelian Keats of C. D. Thorpe, the Shakespearian Keats of John Middleton Murry, the sensuous Keats of H. W. Garrod, the mythopoeic Keats of Edward B. Hungerford, and many others. The totality has certainly enhanced our vision of the poet. It is to Keats's credit that, despite this critical variance, his poetry has emerged relatively unscathed, and even elevated.

If Keats also emerges unscathed from Bernice Slote's new study, it is because he has stature. Reading the great odes from Garrod's fine edition or the moving letters from Rollins' recent volumes enforces the recognition that scholarship can do much to illuminate Keats, but it can do little, at this stage, to diminish his stature. The real danger of *Keats and the Dramatic Principle*, it would seem, is not to Keats or to his writing. The danger is rather to Keatsian scholarship over the past century or more, for though she has read widely and at length in that scholarship, Miss Slote has not read wisely and well. There, as with Keats himself, her reading is piecemeal, fragmented, unrelated to any kind of larger whole that might have provided us with yet another clear vision of the poet.

Take, for example, the author's contention that Keats was interested in the "dramatic," that he was always writing "drama," or that he must be viewed as a "dramatist." We see this thesis reiterated in each of the three sections of the book ("The Poet," "The Play," "The Poem"). But except for a rather confusing distinction between personal and dramatic poetry—Keats, of course, wrote the latter kind—the reader is never allowed any insight into this terminology. By *personal* Miss Slote seems to mean what is generally called *lyric*; and by *dramatic*, what is usually called *narrative*. But then lyric poetry, like narrative poetry, can be dramatic. When she substantiates her insights with a series of quotations from or about Keats, each involving the word *drama*, *dramatist*, or *dramatic*, little light is shed upon the problem.

Miss Slote not only fails to distinguish between Keats's drama and his non-dramatic poetry, but fails to distinguish between Keats's drama and that of his contemporaries. Byron, Shelley, Lamb and Coleridge all wrote drama. In addition, *Don Juan* could certainly

be called "dramatic," and the same term is equally applicable to "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner." And for all the parallels between Keats and Shakespeare that are here drawn (though without the finer subtleties of Murry), there is no real attempt to discriminate between the closet drama of the early nineteenth century and the theatre of Shakespeare and Marlowe, Goldsmith and Sheridan.

Scholars can be grateful for Walter Jackson Bate's grasp of "negative capability" as an aesthetic principle with Keats, or for his careful study of how the later odes develop from the earlier sonnets, or for his insights into the workings of the sympathetic imagination—inherited by Keats from Adam Smith, through Hazlitt—as a kind of dramatic action. It is similarly clear from Earl R. Wasserman's context how in Keats's poetry a metaphysical drama, peculiar to the poet and to the early nineteenth century, takes place. And E. C. Pettet's context makes reasonably lucid how much of Keats's work is a dramatic expression of the poet's own psychological ambiguities about love and destruction. Miss Slote might have ignored these studies and written an impressionistic volume—one of which she is probably quite capable, as her own lyrical style indicates (when it is not constricted by endless references, footnotes, quotations). But by forcing herself to consider all previous scholarship on Keats, without having grasped the organizing principles upon which that scholarship is based, and without having seized upon the pattern of historical criticism in which these principles assume their larger significance, Miss Slote has produced a book which threatens with dangerous confusion the entire Keatsian canon.

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent" T. S. Eliot discusses the function of the poet and artist, relative to dead poets and artists, the existing order of monuments being directed by the past as much as the past is altered by the present. This is certainly a principle of historical criticism, as well as a principle of aesthetic. Miss Slote seems aware of this principle. It is therefore all the more unfortunate that she proves herself incapable in this study of seeing it through judiciously and effectively.

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Stephen E. Whicher, *Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957. xxiv + 517 pp. \$1.25). THIS is a creative work of scholarship disguised as a routine volume of selections. If it has not received much attention that is because such books seldom do, particularly when they are got up, as this one is, exclusively for the classroom. Occasionally, to be sure, a truly original collection slowly gains the reputation it deserves. I am thinking of books like Perry Miller's *The Transcendentalists* or Malcolm Cowley's *Faulkner*. In my view, Mr. Whicher's *Emerson* belongs in this category, and there can be little doubt that sooner or later its quality will be more widely recognized.

In 1953 Mr. Whicher brought out *Freedom and Fate*, an invaluable study of the development of Emerson's thought. The present volume is a documentary companion and, as it were, dramatization of the original essay. Here we are given a series of Emerson's best essays painstakingly arranged within a pattern of excerpts from the journals and letters. The idea, of course, is to have Emerson's own words display and confirm the argument that Mr. Whicher had set forth earlier. What he did not quite say in *Freedom and Fate* now becomes wonderfully clear. We study the *development* of Emerson's thought, even more than that of most philosophers or poets, because its flow is its substance. Mr. Whicher is telling us that we must read Emerson as we would listen to a dialogue between several speakers, all of whom are Emerson. Hence he arranges the prose in ten sections; each turns upon a key episode in the development of the dialogue. The poems appear separately, and in addition there are forty pages of magnificently lucid notes which are, in effect, a handy distillation of much recent scholarship. All in all, this quiet book serves to make Emerson relevant once again.

Twenty years ago Emerson's reputation seemed to be waning. It was then fashionable to measure the worth of ideas by their immediate bearing upon current affairs. But now we have regained our taste for the operations of the farther ranging, abstract, speculative intellect. Although Mr. Whicher avoids modish allusions, one cannot read his comments upon Emerson without recognizing that he writes as a contemporary of, let us say, Albert Camus or certain Christian existentialists. What excites him in Emerson is not so much the validity of any single concept, or even the substance of his world view, but rather the ongoing discourse itself.

Mr. Whicher also enables us to see why it is always so difficult to

cope with Emerson: he is the dialectician *par excellence*. His ideas are fluxional. Every statement leads, according to that principle of polarity which was Emerson's root metaphor for reality, to its opposite. "The essential thing," Mr. Whicher remarks, "is not any given insight but the vital capacity to move from one to the next according to the natural rhythm of thought." Thus all of Emerson's work forms one great essay on the subject of man thinking. But it is more like drama than mere exposition. Instead of characters, in Emerson's theatre we have ideas. They are dramatic in that they never remain in a fixed or logically static relation to each other. Instead of staying ideas in a system, the transcendentalist philosopher attempts to approximate in words the alternating current of thought of a genuinely reflective man.

If this estimate of Emerson's work is sound, as I believe it to be, then Mr. Whicher has hit upon the ideal way to introduce Emerson to new readers. The book suggests that very interplay of fact and idea that forms the core of Emersonian reality. My only criticism is that Mr. Whicher is so constrained and unassuming, so eager to allow Emerson to speak in his own words, that some readers may fail to recognize what is in fact a distinguished revaluation of a major writer. The publishers should urge Mr. Whicher to raise his voice just a bit, and then bring out a new and less austere edition, so that this twentieth century Emerson might be read outside the academy.

Amherst College

LEO MARX

Charles A. Fenton, *Stephen Vincent Benét: The Life and Times of an American Man of Letters, 1898-1943* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1958. xvii + 436 pp. \$4.50). WHAT chiefly emerges from this first major book on Benét is the portrait of an admirable human being, a man whose worth lay quite as much in what he was as in what he did. Of course the excuse for the book is that Benét was a prominent literary figure of the 1920's and 30's, and Mr. Fenton fulfills the promise of his sub-title by giving a full account of how Benét worked and of the milieu in which he lived. One learns a good deal here about the profession of writing in twentieth century America, for Benét was not only one of the most widely read poets of his day, but also a novelist, short-story writer, critic and reviewer, lecturer, teacher and advisor of young authors, even briefly playwright, Holly-

wood script writer, and government propagandist. Because of this wide range of his literary activities, and because he moved so much at the center of the American literary world of his time, this account of his career is perforce well salted with other important literary names, among them Archibald Macleish, Henry Seidel Canby, Edwin Arlington Robinson, Van Wyck Brooks, Paul Engle, Christopher LaFarge. Particularly in his full discussion of *John Brown's Body*, Fenton gives a clear picture of the modern literary process, from the inception of an idea through the various writing stages to the handling of the manuscript by the publisher, the play for the big market by the publicity buildup, including enlisting the interest of a major book club. Benét's relationship with Carl Brandt emphasizes the important role of the literary agent in finding outlets for what the writer produces.

This account also gives a sobering idea of the hazards of the profession. Even for a writer of superior gifts like Benét, who worked hard and steadily during his whole career, who sold almost everything that he wrote for good prices, who made one big strike in *John Brown's Body*, who received critical acclaim and a drawerful of medals and citations for individual works, the pressure of financial need was constant. Very properly, Mr. Fenton focuses throughout upon Benét as poet, even though most of his literary energies during most of his life were given to writing prose fiction for money. We have his greatest work only because a Guggenheim award gave enough respite from the fiction mill to let him do the necessary research and write the poem. According to this book, there is good reason to believe that except for the hard hand of mammon we might have had much more, and possibly greater poetry from Benét.

In addition to presenting the life and times, this book also gives some critical evaluation of the works, but this is hardly the book's strongest point. Mr. Fenton's practice in this respect is both to summarize contemporary critical reaction to Benét's writings and to make his own running commentary on them. He makes a good defense of Benét's kind of "popular" poetry; he shows how he was able to break through the formula-barriers of the large circulation magazines with such stories as "The Devil and Daniel Webster"; he demonstrates that Benét's best work in prose or verse usually came when he was able to exploit imaginatively the myth and fact of the American past. It is the place of a biographer, undoubtedly, to exhibit his subject's virtues, but Mr. Fenton here seems so much under the spell of his attractive

subject that in discussing the writings he acts more as advocate than as impartial judge, and one puts down this book with a higher opinion of Benét's greatness as a writer than he probably deserves. *John Brown's Body* might deserve the degree of enthusiasm registered here, and to a lesser degree so might *Western Star*; but the novels and most of the other prose, except for a handful of short stories, hardly impress one as having the degree of merit Mr. Fenton finds in them—nor do the lesser poems, with some few exceptions. The field is still open for a more searching critique of Benét's writings.

University of Florida

GORDON BIGELOW

Charles S. Singleton, *Journey to Beatrice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. vi + 291 pp. \$4.50. *Dante Studies*, 2). SOME familiarity with Professor Singleton's *Dante Studies I* is indispensable for a proper understanding of the present volume which is basically a close analysis of the first of the two essential elements in the structure of the *Divine Comedy* as defined in the first volume; its allegory in contradistinction to its symbolism. Without a firm grasp of this "truly continuing dimension of the poem" one can only hope to read "what amounts to an amputated version" (p. v). Professor Singleton repeats more strongly than on various past occasions his conviction that ever since the Renaissance the *Comedy* has suffered immeasurably because of the tendency to discount a way of looking at reality which saw very real relationships between orders of existence. Today, "Things in nature are things, events in history are simply events, and that is that" (p. 95). This, for Professor Singleton, was not Dante's way of viewing reality, and he undertakes to prove it by methodically showing, through careful and ample documentation, that the poet "constructed his allegory on points of doctrine firmly established and widely current in his time, (and) built with materials which were, so to speak, public property" (p. vi) and the very foundations of reality (p. 95).

Professor Singleton concedes the impossibility of transforming modern readers into "readers of Dante's time" (p. 8), but considers it highly worth while to try to reconstruct and perhaps understand the main outlines of those basic truths that the poet considered enduring and that continue to constitute the essential fabric of the poem, even though it has become difficult for modern eyes to recognize them.

Chief among these is "the very notion of a journey of the mind and heart to God in this life," a notion which "now requires such an effort of the historical imagination as would have been a veritable scandal to the mediaeval mind" (p. 8). Throughout the book, however, the emphasis is on Dante's *staging* of these truths. As a result it successfully avoids becoming a mere theological excursion.

The two Parts of the book themselves reflect an essential pattern of Dante's basic allegory of a journey. Just as the Fall caused a dichotomy in Man's nature, so must his journey now reflect a twofold movement that in some mysterious way must go forward and backward at the same time: a "Journey to Beatrice" and a "Return to Eden."

Chapter I attempts to define the basic nature of "The Allegorical Journey" primarily in Augustinian and Thomistic terms. For St. Augustine it was above all a journey of love, and therefore of the will. For St. Thomas it was a matter of vision and intellect. In the *Comedy* both may be seen: Virgil guides to rectitude of the will, Beatrice to perfection of intellect. The poem, therefore, contains "two master patterns of paradigms in this matter of a journey to God in the soul," one leading to a first goal, which is Beatrice herself, the other to the Ultimate Vision. But though the book is mainly concerned with that area of the journey extending to the first goal, it must work constantly within both patterns since will and intellect are inextricable in the movement of the poem as even in that of the soul. For Professor Singleton the first master pattern, involving the will, is best seen and understood in the *Comedy* as three "conversions"; the second, pertaining to intellect, as three "lights."

Chapter II, "The Three Lights," takes its movement from St. Thomas' conception of three kinds of intellectual vision functioning under three kinds of light: the natural light, the light of faith, the light of glory. It then analyzes the poetic transfiguration that Dante gave these concepts in the figures of Virgil, Beatrice and St. Bernard. As ways of "seeing" God, these three kinds of light were also modes of marking off three orders of existence or of being: the human, the angelic and the divine. Professor Singleton shows in each case not only how closely Dante's use of the three guides follows doctrine, but the highly artistic nature of his transfigurations.

Chapter III, "The Three Conversions" is concerned with the second half of the master pattern of Dante's allegory—the movement of the will as distinguished from that of intellect. Once again St. Thomas' views, this time on the "threefold turning of the will to God," are

presented as typical of the theology of Dante's day. And once again the connection is convincingly made with Dante's three guides and with his skill in maintaining the perspective of the *viator* while coordinating the notion of "light" in the pattern of intellect with "conversion" in that of the will. In the advent of Beatrice attended by the virtues of faith and charity we have both a new kind of light and a new ordering of the will, inasmuch as, doctrinally, faith pertains to vision and charity to the will. Of special interest in this chapter is the discussion of "conversion with Virgil" and the complex process involved in his role of "disposing" a soul to receive "form"—a process deriving from the Aristotelian concepts of matter, form and *generatio* and very much present in the theology of the times.

The conversion achieved under Virgil's guidance as an ordering toward a supernatural end leads to Chapter IV on "Justification." With this chapter begins an exposition of a subordinate pattern of allegory: the concept of justification as it occurs in the individual soul or in history on both the natural and supernatural plane. For St. Thomas, justification meant movement toward justice, but by justice he meant something beyond the Aristotelian-Platonic "right order in the soul." For him such order necessarily implied due subjection to God's will. If correctly viewed, the "end" of the journey staged in the *Divine Comedy* was just such a movement in the direction of right order in the soul and before God. The type of justice to which Virgil leads falls strictly within the Aristotelian definition, for it is a justice only as far as Virgil can discern. Beyond this limit we find Beatrice waiting with a justice subscribing to St. Thomas' Christian extension of Aristotle's definition, a justice that could not be known to Plato, Aristotle or Virgil.

Chapter V, on the "Advent of Beatrice" is an expanded version of a study appearing in the *Annual Report of the Dante Society* for 1954 in which St. Bernard's views on a triple Advent of Christ were analyzed. It is interesting to note how in the present context the ideas expressed in that study gain in conviction and perspective as a result of falling between two chapters on *Iustitia* which, as the *sine qua non* for the triple Advent, is the key for equating the advent of Beatrice with Christ's three comings.

The pattern of meaning at the summit of Purgatory becomes clearer and fuller as we recognize the presence therein of the further doctrinal concept of "Justification in History," discussed in Chapter VI. In the perspective of historical allegory each actor becomes endowed

with a proper other meaning: Dante as Mankind, Beatrice as Christ, Virgil as Rome. But the truly amazing achievement of Dante's staging of the drama of salvation is the manner in which, on the literal, moral and historical levels, it reflects a constant correspondence between event in soul and event in history without violating the proportion of human nature up to the very top of the mountain. The chapter ends with a documented exposition of how this correspondence between order in the soul and order in the state, or even in soul and event in history, was a very real way of seeing for the medieval mind.

Chapters VII and VIII try to define what awaited the wayfarer at the summit of Purgatory. First there was a particular kind of happiness having Aristotelian roots and defined in terms of perfection of the active and contemplative orders of life. In the *Comedy* this is reflected especially in Dante's dream of Leah and Rachel, in which Leah (or perfection of the active life) is a form of justice and the counterpart of Virgil who leads to a condition of justice in the will and disposes the soul for something beyond. This is in turn a form of contemplation that in a Christian sense is synonymous with Wisdom; and may indeed bear many names: Christ, Sapientia, Contemplation, Light of Grace, Beatrice. Virgil may lead to a condition of the active life characterized by the acquired cardinal virtues, but with Beatrice there is a going beyond. The acquired virtues become infused virtues and are complemented by the three theological ones. As a consequence, while Beatrice retains qualities that a Virgil might recognize as those of "Lady Philosophy," she is also readily recognized as Christian *Sapientia*. "Through her a man becomes again an "adopted son" of God (p. 133) . . . there comes a Wisdom which includes Lady Philosophy but transcends that Lady by being her perfection" (p. 134). At the summit of Purgatory, therefore, Dante regains a condition enjoyed by Adam before the fall.

Part II, composed of six chapters and entitled "Return to Eden," is concerned primarily with an explanation of the tone set in Canto I of *Purgatory* where the poet introduces a lament for that northern clime which is widowed and deprived of the sight of the four stars over Eden. Assuming that the lament somehow refers to the Fall and to the loss of Eden, Professor Singleton concentrates on the role played by the four stars in conveying this tone which seems to dominate the entire *cantica*. First he establishes a connection between the obvious meaning of the stars (the cardinal virtues) and the four maidens who accompany Beatrice. Next he shows how Dante, with

the four stars, replaced the four traditional rivers of Eden as found in Genesis. At the core of this transposition is the classical myth of Astraea or Virgo—the “star-maiden” who, as Justice, had traditionally lived among men before they fell into corruption. Since Justice is, of the four virtues, the “mother of all,” and since original justice is what more than anything else mankind lost as a result of the Fall, the lament over the four stars acquires heightened significance. Matelda, too, gains in stature by being identified as the personification of such original justice. And as we note the correspondence between Dante’s desire for Matelda and the lament over the four stars, the entire *cantica* assumes an impressive artistic unity.

The book reaches a high point in Chapter XIII where we are made to see the ambiguity placed by Dante in his poem in answering the question “Is Paradise regained?” The “yes and no” answer is staged for us in the wayfarer’s failure to possess Matelda (natural justice) and his attainment, on the other hand, of Beatrice (personal justice). This drama also affords deeper insight into mankind’s lament over the four stars. Doctrine taught that while Christ’s passion had enabled each Man to regain union with God, this was only a partial return to original justice. To regain that justice in its entirety man has to have order and subjection restored to his sensitive nature and to his body. As a result of Christ’s passion, Man can enjoy only the infused cardinal virtues of personal justice which does not imply such perfection, for while, through Sanctifying Grace, Man has partially recovered control over his sensitive nature, there is still the death of his body. Whence the lament over the four stars in Canto I of *Purgatory*, a lament intended to characterize a man’s personal return to Eden.

The very last chapter shows that the roles of Virgil and Beatrice may thus be defined in terms of two types of justice achieved in a return to Eden. Virgil leads to the Aristotelian justice in which the inferior powers of the soul are subject to reason; Beatrice leads to the Pauline justice in which what is highest in man (reason) is subject to God. This return to Eden consisting of the reacquisition of two justices, a human and a transhuman, is also in accord with Scripture and doctrine, for in Genesis there are two moments in Adam’s creation. God first formed Adam outside the Garden and then placed him therein. Scriptural exegetes had interpreted this as signifying that Adam had been formed first in nature and then, in a second moment, had been elevated to a condition of grace above nature. And

just as the first of these moments was considered as leading to the second, so it is with Virgil and Beatrice. "At the summit and end of the climb up the mountain, when Eden is reached, we may see history somehow repeating itself; as it was with Adam in his formation, so now with this man, so now with "man," in his re-formation" (p. 283).

To take serious issue with most of the points developed in this book, which will doubtless become a classic in Dante criticism, is difficult indeed if one agrees with the premise that to understand the *Comedy* properly a reader must try to recapture somehow the original focus in which it was written. If it is granted that at the heart of the poem's allegory is the metaphor of a journey to God, then this book is truly a reliable guide from milestone to milestone. Likewise, if it is granted that of all doctrinal authorities it was St. Thomas that Dante followed most closely but that the *Comedy* reflects a synthesis of a number of theological truths that were "in the air" at the time of its writing, then again it would be difficult to find serious fault with Professor Singleton's method. If it is, furthermore, granted that while the *Comedy* is a great Christian monument it is also an attempt to summarize the history of mankind without losing sight of the contributions made by pre-Christian civilizations, the soundness of the book's general orientation can hardly be questioned. But perhaps most important of all, if it is granted that the tremendous poetic effectiveness of the *Comedy* is somehow anchored on the superb manner in which Dante manages to stage what for him and for an entire civilization have been the most vital and enduring of truths, then this book can truly be looked upon as a keystone in Dante criticism.

Basically, the first part of the book is a kind of atomization of the journey metaphor, the second of the goal achieved, the summit of Purgatory. In short, the book is a thoroughgoing analysis of the "psychology" of Christian salvation as staged by Christianity's greatest poet. Like the poem itself, the 14 chapters of the book form a tightly knit whole which is not easy reading. The notes at the end of each chapter indicate a careful restraint to avoid proliferation while the appended list of theological authorities consulted offers a valuable bibliographical guide.

There are however a few points in the book that may not appear entirely convincing. In Chapter 2, while it is true that Virgil seems to fall naturally within the pattern of 3 lights, this seems to be

arrived at through an inductive leap that lacks the solid foundations provided for the establishment of the other two lights. The same may be said of Chapters 10 and 11 where the explanation of how Dante converted the 4 rivers of Eden into 4 stars and the central role ascribed to the myth of Virgo appear more ingenious than completely convincing. Or, again, in Chapter XII the attempt to establish Dante's deliberate use of the *pastorella* as a device to convey a specific meaning inherent in his encounter with Matelda may not satisfy all readers. Yet, in each case the interpretation certainly affords new dimensions of meaning to the episodes in question as well as new insights into Dante's artistic power. Something not too different may be said about the last chapter whose climactic nature is somewhat weakened by the fact that in comparing Dante's "crossing over" from Virgil to Beatrice to 2 moments in Adam's creation Professor Singleton has recourse to a highly controversial doctrine with which St. Thomas himself took serious exception. Here too, though, one strongly feels that the position cannot be too far from the truth and may indeed well be the key to the proper understanding of the journey metaphor.

The difficulty of explaining the manner in which the terribly complex principal and subordinate patterns of allegory are fused together and are staged artistically by the poet is doubtless responsible for a disturbing stylistic flaw which mars the lucid and sophisticated prose usually found in Professor Singleton's studies. This is an excessive repetition of points that betrays an undue concern to make certain that the reader is following the argument. This, together with the similarly disturbing polemical tone relating to how the Divine Comedy has been misread for many years (esp. on p. 99), seems to detract somewhat from an otherwise effective presentation. On the other hand, one does forcefully feel the infinite and intricate dimensions and patterns in the texture of the *Comedy*; to the point, indeed, of wondering sometimes whether even a reader of Dante's time could possibly have seen most of them with any degree of ease.

All such reservations are nevertheless insignificant in comparison to the new and exciting insights afforded by the book—a book which certainly provides abundant evidence "that we are never through growing up to Dante's *Commedia*" (p. 74).

Harpur College

ALDO S. BERNARDO

Ulrich Leo, *Zur dichterischen Originalität des Arcipreste de Hita* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958. 131 pp. *Analecta Romanica*, 6). PROFESSOR Leo's new study of the *Libro de Buen Amor* will be warmly welcomed by everyone concerned with medieval Spanish literature. While his book is, of course, addressed to a scholarly audience, his primary concern, as he himself tells us (pp. 31-32), is with the literary work as it appears to the cultivated reader, rather than to the scholarly specialist, whether his specialty be stylistic analysis or source-hunting.

The essence of Professor Leo's critical method is comparison, and comparison in the strictest sense: the detailed confrontation of two more or less similar texts. Thus, he compares Juan Ruiz's lament for the death of Trotaconventos with the *Vers de la Mort* of Hélinant de Froidmont, and contrasts Don Melón's despair when he learns from Trotaconventos that he must renounce all hope of winning Doña Endrina both with the Latin *Pamphilus* and with Jehan Bras-de-Fer's fourteenth-century French version of the Latin text. Similar comparisons are made between parts of the *Libro de Buen Amor* itself, for example, between the stories of Doña Endrina and Doña Garoça; here Professor Leo effectively contrasts the wealth of homely detail in the first with the almost complete lack of any kind of social background in the second (pp. 75 ff.). His comparisons are doubly valuable, for they not only clarify the relationships between the several texts, but also help us to understand each on its own terms. The *Pamphilus*, in particular emerges as a work which can hold our interest in its own right and not simply as a source for Juan Ruiz's masterpiece. Professor Leo's interpretations are in the best tradition of German *Stilforschung*; he is equally successful with minute, "common-sense" analysis of an action and with close analysis of the verbal texture of a passage. A good example of the latter is his explanation of the artistic rôle of the names Juan Ruiz gives to the principles in his version of the *Pamphilus* story: they introduce a note of fantasy which holds in check the prosaically bourgeois flavor of the story itself (p. 57).

No one who attempts a critical study of so complex and enigmatic a work as the *Libro de Buen Amor* can hope to win the unqualified approval of all his readers. This is all the more true in the case of a book like Professor Leo's, so much of which is concerned with hypotheses, often provocative and always presented with a most disarming modesty (e. g., p. 23, "während meine Hoffnung, die Leser

dieser Zeilen mit meinem Vorschlag zu überzeugen, nicht allzu gross ist"). A case in point is his suggestion that the *Libro* may have been planned as a mock epic centering around Trotaconventos; the hypothesis is extremely interesting but it is hardly susceptible of proof, and, to this reviewer at least, is not wholly convincing.

The most serious objection which can be raised to Professor Leo's interpretation of the *Libro* is, I think, that he fails to give due weight to Juan Ruiz's explicit and often repeated declarations that his book is intended as a guide to moral conduct, the practice of that Christian *caritas*, with which, as Professor Spitzer pointed out some years ago, *buen amor* is surely to be equated. Thus, Professor Leo considers the *Corbacho* of the Archpriest of Talavera as, in part, an attack on the *Libro de Buen Amor*, though he concedes that Alfonso Martínez de Toledo seems to speak respectfully of Juan Ruiz and wonders why he does so since the latter's "moralischer Indifferentismus" can only have been repugnant to him. I would suggest that Martínez de Toledo simply failed to see any such moral indifference in Juan Ruiz's book and, indeed, I should go further and assert that he did not see it because it is not really there. Both the *Corbacho* and the *Libro de Buen Amor* are directed against *el amor loco de este mundo*; the difference between the two lies in the form of the attack, which, in the *Corbacho*, is presented discursively in a tone which often rises to a veritable frenzy of moral indignation, and, in the *Libro de Buen Amor*, is presented through the medium of an extremely subtle poetic language highly charged with irony. To document an assertion of this kind is obviously far beyond the scope of a review; I can only refer the reader to my own recent study of Christian allegory in the *Libro de Buen Amor*.¹

The Johns Hopkins University

THOMAS R. HART, JR.

Gregor Sebba, *Nicolas Malebranche, 1638-1715. A Preliminary Bibliography* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia, 1959. 90 pp.). THIS offering comes as a much-needed instrument of investigation. The author, who has made many contributions to economics and sociology, has searched with equal strength in the realms of literature

¹ *La alegoría en el Libro de Buen Amor* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1959).

and philosophy. It is to be hoped that his studies of Rousseau and of the theory of poetry, among others, will see the light before long. For numerous years, in particular, he has pursued to their furthest extensions various problems related to Cartesian thought, and in so doing has built up what the late Professor Balz described to the present writer as a storehouse or fortress of Cartesian bibliography unmatched in solidity, amplitude, and completeness. For numerous years, this treasury of learning, while steadily and privately in the making, has not been widely known or utilized. At last, Professor Sebba recently began to make it available by contributing two capital chapters, on Descartes and on Malebranche, to the 17th-century volume of the Cabeen *Critical Bibliography of French Literature*, to appear this year. Out of these, happily, have grown this full-scale, comprehensive bibliographical study of Malebranche, already published, and another on Descartes which is currently being presented, in two volumes, and will require separate treatment.

The Malebranche volume, which absorbs the 75 entries originally drawn up for the strictly selective listing in the Cabeen volume, has now expanded to 480 entries of books and articles, distributed in seven sections: (1) Bibliography; (2) Collectanea; (3) Works of Malebranche (Collected Works, Selections, Single Works, Translations, Correspondence, Controversies); (4) Malebranche Criticism, Locke to Maine de Biran; (5) Life of Malebranche; (6) General Studies; (7) Special Studies; two indexes, of subjects and names, are added. Two important features of the critical method of listing entries in the Cabeen bibliography have been retained here. Whenever possible, significant or helpful reviews are listed at the end of an entry, to assist readers in appraising the work in question. With or without this supplementary aid, Professor Sebba offers for each publication that has been accessible to him a critical-descriptive annotation. These notices are an adornment and enrichment of the volume. They present an array of compact evaluations, lucid, perceptive, penetrating, and authoritative; they are graced with touches of humor and bold thrusts of independent judgment which communicate a sense of the author's familiarity with the subject, and his command over it. This mastery, however, is asserted with but a bare, irreducible minimum of that professional parlance to which others might have heavily resorted for condensation, or for authority. Malebranche, like Descartes, is a dominant figure not only in the forefront of seventeenth-century philosophy but in the background of literary life at that time. To

students of literature, he should be as familiar as Descartes; it is time, indeed, that literary studies showed a deeper knowledge of both. With an approach essentially humanistic, but in full control of technicalities, Professor Sebba offers here an invaluable bibliography that will be congenial to literary scholars.

It is, as he announces, a preliminary bibliography. The third and fourth sections are offered as "provisional"; "for a definitive critical treatment of the tangled bibliography of certain works of Malebranche and of biographical sources," the last volume of André Robinet's *Œuvres complètes de Malebranche* "must be awaited" (p. 9). But in the treatment of works on Malebranche, it seems unlikely that any omission of important material will be found; none occurs to the present reviewer, after more than one check. In this listing of publications written in numerous languages, there is a strikingly low number of spelling inaccuracies; those that occur are due especially to the greater hazards in proofreading mimeographed material. The author, however, would be grateful for "critical comment, corrections, additions, and suggestions for the improvement of this provisional bibliography." This is a welcome opportunity to relay his request. The work, brought out in very workmanlike and readable mimeographed form, is made available without cost.

Whatever may be altered in a final draft, so that the rigorous author himself may no longer consider any part of it provisional, this preliminary bibliography is in itself an event and, it is to be hoped, but the first of many to come. Even after the completion of André Robinet's monumental new edition of Malebranche, it is safe to predict that Professor Sebba's guide to Malebranche literature will continue to be a contribution of distinctive quality, and of lasting worth.

The Johns Hopkins University

NATHAN EDELMAN

Kenneth N. McKee, *The Theater of Marivaux* (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1958. xvi + 277 pp. \$5.00). FEW writers in France have enjoyed greater critical fortune during the last twenty years than Marivaux, who at last seems to have found his rightful place among the great. A study in English such as the present proposes to be is long overdue, both in view of Marivaux's increased European prestige and of the success his comedies have enjoyed

recently when played in this country by the visiting French companies. The only other book-length study in English (Jamieson, *Marivaux, A Study in Sensibility*) dealt with a more limited aspect of Marivaux's work. There is in no language a systematic play-by-play analysis of Marivaux's theater. Professor McKee has undertaken to fill this lacuna, and proposes "to study each play in chronological order with an *historique*, to point out the innovations that Marivaux introduced . . . , and to highlight those qualities in his plays that have given them enduring and increasing prestige in the French theater." The book should be welcomed by admirers of one of France's most subtle and even perhaps most French of writers. In some ways they will be pleased, in others, disappointed.

There is a delightful prefatory note by Barrault, in the form of a letter to the author, which reflects the sensitive understanding that has made him and his wife such successful interpreters of Marivaux. "Marivaux," he writes, "est de la cuisine à la française, elle se fait 'à feu doux'!"

In the introductory chapter, an essay on the state of the French theater in the early eighteenth century, Professor McKee stresses the importance of the Italian players in Paris, to whom Marivaux was greatly indebted, not so much for sources as for spirit and acting tradition, and who were to be his most faithful and successful interpreters of that time.

Each of the following chapters is devoted to an individual play, setting forth the circumstances under which the latter was written and its date of first performance. An analysis of the play, in most cases little more than a summary, pertinent literary problems connected with the play, quotations of the most important notices on the play at its first and subsequent performances, and finally a personal judgment on the play, make up the pattern the author follows in most of the chapters.

Professor McKee indicates a number of the problems which confront Marivaux scholarship, without burdening his text with lengthy discussions of them, but with a clear statement of each, and his own conclusions. Among these problems are Molière's influence on Marivaux (something Marivaux was ever ready to deny), from the first comedy, *Le Père prudent et équitable*, through the two *Surprises de l'amour* and the *Ecole des mères*; Marivaux's valets who prefigure Figaro; and Marivaux's contribution to the development of the *drame*

bourgeois. With a sure knowledge of his subject, Professor McKee makes many sound and convincing observations.

For this reviewer, the most satisfactory chapters are those dealing with the two *Surprises*, the *Jeu de l'amour et du hasard*, and the *Fausse confidences*, for the author pushes his analysis beyond mere recapitulation of plot, etc., and comes to the heart of the matter. Particularly interesting are the "press notices" accorded the plays over the years. These afford an interesting survey of Marivaux's varying fortunes.

On the whole, Professor McKee has written a dependable book. It grows somewhat monotonous, however, in treating individual plays with so little variation from chapter to chapter. It might have been somewhat more modern in its critical approach (see, for example, the brilliant analysis by Georges Poulet in *La Distance intérieure*). One might also question some of the author's statements, particularly on the difficulty of finding Marivaux's sources (p. 130), in the light of Professor Frédéric Deloffre's success in revealing a number hitherto ignored (see his critical editions of *Le Petit Maître corrigé*, *La Vie de Marianne*, and his *Marivaux et le marivaudage*).

The book is attractively printed with a number of photographic reproductions of recent and early performances, and a convenient index. Despite its shortcomings, it will serve as a useful introduction to Marivaux.

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ROBERT G. MARSHALL

Mark J. Temmer, *Time in Rousseau and Kant. An Essay in French Pre-Romanticism* (Geneva: Droz and Paris: Minard, 1958. 79 pp.). MR. Temmer's pretensions in this essay are modest. He intends it to be a contribution to our understanding of the "romantic revolution." He insists, however, that he has in no way attempted to distinguish, far less to deal with, all the numerous problems of romanticism, and that his aim was to isolate only one of them. His essay is an analysis of efforts made in the eighteenth century, by Rousseau and by Kant, to resolve the dualism between thought and experience. Unlike Cassirer and those who preceded him in his approach to Rousseau, notably Delbos, Gurvitch and, of course, Kant

himself,¹ Mr. Temmer does not interpret Rousseau in the light of Kant. In his view the dualism of thought and experience presented itself to Rousseau as an existential problem, to Kant as a logical or epistemological one. Thus time was the rack on which Rousseau's mind was stretched, whereas it was the condition of Kant's unity of the understanding and of the phenomenal world. But time for Kant and time for Rousseau are not the same. In Rousseau time plays an ontological role, in Kant it is a transcendental construct with a logical function in our intellectual and moral understanding of life.

It is valuable to have these differences pointed out, and despite a somewhat turgid style, Mr. Temmer has made a good job of bringing them to light. But while both Rousseau and Kant are individually related to romanticism, or to particular aspects of it—this part of Mr. Temmer's essay could profitably be expanded—their relation to each other is nowhere made clear, and one wonders what prompted Mr. Temmer to write on both in the same essay. The only justification for his having done so appears to be that the work of both men exercised a determining influence on the modes of thought and feeling of the romantic writers. The disproportionate amount of space allotted to each (54 pages to Rousseau as against 12 to Kant) and the author's rather weak efforts to relate the two parts of his essay—he seems, on the contrary, more concerned to emphasize that the close connections established by the neo-Kantians are not valid for all aspects of Rousseau and Kant—leave one with the feeling that Mr. Temmer has not really done what he promised to do.

In the chapters on Rousseau Mr. Temmer is deeply indebted to Poulet, but he tries to achieve greater systematization than Poulet. He finds a dialectical movement in Rousseau's soul between two moments which he characterizes as arguments A and B: the wish to attain absolute freedom in a kind of ineffable living present on the one hand, and, when the fulfillment of this is thwarted by awareness of time, the attempt to lift himself up into the timeless world of the mind and of conscience on the other. It could be argued that arguments A and B can best be expressed in Derathé's formulation as *sensibilité passive* and *sensibilité active*. However they stand in relation to each other psychologically, this argument would continue, these two forms of *sensibilité* are not rationally opposed to each other in Rousseau. The former is a lower form of awareness than the latter, which is the

¹ Kant's neglected interpretation is in his *Muthmassiger Anfang der Menschengeschichte*.

specifically human form of awareness for Rousseau. In this sense the natural man of the *Discourses* and the citizen of the *Social Contract* are not antithetically related as they are for Mr. Temmer. The movement is in one direction only, from the first to the second. Mr. Temmer makes the point, however, that the passage from one to the other can take place only outside of time and experience for Rousseau, and consequently does not really reconcile the realms of existence and thought.

It is not easy to criticize Mr. Temmer for unduly emphasizing the existential problem in the pre-romantic and romantic writers at the expense of the formal or political and historical aspects of their work, when he goes to such pains to insist that his essay deals with only one element in what he admits is a complex cultural situation. Nevertheless, his approach to Rousseau himself continues to bother me. He concedes that other methods of approach may be equally valid on their own levels, but I am not sure that this generosity justifies the existentialist interpretation of Rousseau that he himself offers. The work of almost any thinker could conceivably be viewed as an attempt to overcome the supposedly primitive datum of the individual's *Geworfenheit*. Whether we judge this a valid approach will depend in large measure on whether or not we ourselves are existentialists. It is perfectly possible that Rousseau was disturbed by existential anguish. It seems undeniable however that he saw the problems of morality and liberty as problems to be resolved by man in society, not as absolute problems for the individual to resolve independently of and even in opposition to the social medium. Virtually alone in condemning the Enlightenment ideology of harmony through the pursuit of individual interest and seeing no immediate or practical way of reshaping society, Rousseau may well have been so overwhelmed at times by loneliness and despair that he came to feel his position as a permanent condition of existence itself, a dereliction in the world. But to consider this as fundamental and the moral, political, and educational writings as ways of resolving an existential anguish may be putting the cart before the horse both historically and psychologically. Nor ought we to be misled by a certain abstractness in Rousseau's reflections on man. Like other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers Rousseau often considered the position of man in the universe abstractly, but this was a methodological device for questioning or reframing the relations of men in society, not an object of speculation in and for itself.

Mr. Temmer has written an original and challenging study of Rousseau. To existentialists it will also be convincing. It seems to me that if his thesis is to be assailed, it must be assailed at its roots, in a certain understanding of man and of history.

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LIONEL GOSSMAN

David I. Grossvogel, *The Self-Conscious Stage in Modern French Drama* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. 378 pp. \$5.00). THIS promises at first glance to be an interesting book, one that has long been awaited: "A comprehensive view of the modern French Theater," as the jacket announces. Unfortunately, further examination proves disappointing.

The fault of Mr. Grossvogel's book would seem to derive from the fact that the author was not quite certain whether he was writing a history of modern French theater, a volume of textual exegesis, or a treatise on dramatic aesthetics. This uncertainty leads to curious omissions and a blurring of perspective which are most confusing. The reader who is in search of factual information will find little here. The work of Antoine, Lugué-Poë, the *Cartel* is barely mentioned, if at all. There is no mention of Barrault, of Vilar, of the *TNP*. The author does not concern himself with any of the social, cultural, or historical conditions within which the French theater has developed. It becomes consequently very difficult to know from what assumptions of knowledge Mr. Grossvogel is proceeding. Because he has failed to situate his subject in time, he is unable to deal with matters of chronology, the interrelationships of the many different aspects of the theatrical enterprise, the relationship of literary theater to literature in general, the demands of entertainment, so different at different periods, as against the need for serious artistic expression. The result is a naive view of theater which passes rapidly over the difficult problems and concentrates on details which are not related to any whole. An occasional peremptory statement is offered by way of historical clarification. Thus the essay on Jarry begins:

Secure and unquestioned as Monsieur Prudhomme might have considered his world, its very existence was in jeopardy wherever it implicated art forms that brooked no concessions but to themselves. This confrontation of the "genuine" artist and the less dedicated cannot be isolated according to historical moments. Rather, it is a question of noting here the forces con-

tending at this particular time and examining those which, by the end of the nineteenth century, were to upset the most solid edifices of conventional art. Because he had failed to solve, or even suggest, transcendental riddles, the bourgeois was now to suffer the advent of new values that accepted the riddle as an ultimate destined to supersede his numb and obsolescent oracles. Eventually, the new cult acquired historic tenure as the subconscious, surrealism, dada, non-objectivism, the absurd, etc., but not before the heyday of individual iconoclasts. (Page 19).

Such a statement is typical of Mr. Grossvogel's method. It is suggested that due consideration has been given to the problem of art in society, the conflict of artist and common citizen, the problem of chronology and time, the problem of literary form and content. But in reality Mr. Grossvogel has said no more than that, after 1896, the common citizen is to be severely punished for having been very superficial and for having treated the artist so badly. At best this is an over-simplification. Moreover, we are led into many errors quite unconsciously. Again it is suggested that Mr. Grossvogel has thoroughly synthesized the material to which he refers and that from Jarry and Freud to Sartre and Camus a single enterprise is involved. I would be willing to accept such a generalization if it bore some recognizable name such as "the liberation of man." But I consider it superficial and even irresponsible to imply that from Jarry and Freud to Sartre and Camus via Tristan Tzara, Breton, Picasso, there is merely the question of a new cult acquiring historic tenure.

Mr. Grossvogel's book is also a volume of textual exegesis. There are "explanations" of important modern plays from Jarry's *Ubu Roi* to Beckett's *En attendant Godot*. Yet here the author's method fails for lack of rigor and selection. He does not furnish the reader with a necessary context which would have made his explanations meaningful. His commentaries are interrupted by sections similar to the one cited above. It is never clear just what the task at hand actually is. The identity of the individual work of art never clearly emerges. It remains submerged in a body of commentary that is uncertain and erratic. An example of such confusion is the author's essay on Anouilh, the longest single essay in his book (57 pages), somewhat mysteriously entitled "Commercialism Reconsidered," since at no point in the essay is there any consideration of commercialism at all.

But the real fault of the book lies elsewhere. Many of its confusions, errors of taste, lack of discernment, arise from the fact that the author is not writing about the French theater at all, but on the

general subject of aesthetics for which French theater serves as a vehicle. This in itself is all to the good. Certainly it is legitimate and even necessary to inquire, beyond the limits of a given specialty, into the nature of theater, literature, art, the aesthetic enterprise in general. Yet this is not what Mr. Grossvogel does. Such an inquiry would require precision, definition of terms (or the systematic rejection of definition); it would above all require the formulation of problems. But Mr. Grossvogel formulates no problems, raises no specific questions, and defines no terms. The basic problem for any literary theorist is "What is literature?" If he is to answer this question at all, it must be in the form of some unifying theory that accounts for literary phenomena in all their diversity through time and space. Few theorists except Sartre have felt themselves equal to the task. Yet apparently Mr. Grossvogel has some ambitions as such a theorist. Why else would he refer to himself so unpleasantly as "this theorist"? Why else would his editors make the claim in their blurb that his book presents "a new means of dramatic interpretation that relates the theater to an aesthetics of the stage"? I gather that this new means of dramatic interpretation is the point of view advanced by the author in the first chapter of his book entitled "Some Implications of Laughter":

In the sense that electrically charged wires are said to be "live," the live actor on stage establishes with the live spectator that unique contact which is the dramatic experience. In the living actor, the spectator finds the only extension of himself that will enable his reality to permeate the sham proposed by the actor for transmutation. Arts that imitate the drama, such as those of puppets or the motion pictures, demand auto-hypnosis by the spectator in order that he might credit them: he has to *imagine* a man who will become him. Arts that do not imitate drama, such as opera or the ballet, but that make use of the live presence on stage, intensify a part of that sensory presence for the gratification of a similarly sensory perceptor; these arts are called "pure" when the contact which they effect is direct, and they degenerate in proportion as their life is diverted for other ends.

It is not possible to state in more confusing language the simple fact that in the theater both audience and actors are living people. Just how this results in the dramatic experience is another matter. Moreover the passage rests on an analogy that is quite false, since electrically charged wires, however "live," are still not alive. What is meant by the statement that puppet-shows and motion pictures imitate the theater whereas opera and ballet do not? There is no

question of imitation. These are other media of the theater. I gather he is getting at the point that opera and ballet are rather spectacle than dramatic experience. Now Mr. Grossvogel goes on to say that theater is a dramatic ritual and that the spectator, far from being passive, is a participant. From this statement he draws the baffling conclusion that "the degree and nature of this participation determines in effect the type and quality of the drama being performed." Just how participation *determines* type and quality of drama is not said. Of course, the essential point has been missed. Serious theater is of the domain of art and not of the domain of spectacle. It is besides literary art. Consequently, the problem of literature in relation to the other arts must be dealt with before we can hope to understand just what dramatic experience really involves. But the pseudo-positivism of Mr. Grossvogel's view prevents him from dealing with this question. He has simply forgotten literary authorship and *Sire le Mot*.

Since theater is traditionally divided into comedy and tragedy, the author now embarks on a summary analysis of laughter the purpose of which is to show that the responses to comedy and tragedy are not "conveniently distinct from each other." Three pages are devoted to brief statements on laughter from Freud, Sully, Grieg, Krishna Menon, Herbert Spenser, Bergson, Schopenhauer, Kant, Munro, Hobbes. These references, which the author cannot hope to analyze adequately in the space he allows himself, serve to ground a dissatisfaction which the author feels and to substantiate his own view of laughter, derived from Freud: "The permissibility and danger of mirth." This statement serves to underpin the author's further statement: "And if endless definers have attempted to mellow and subdue the quality of this brazen assault, one is tempted to surmise that they have done so because they could not accept this spontaneous residue of social mayhem in a generally ossified society." (Page 4.)

One sees now a little better what Mr. Grossvogel is about. His formalistic methods have prevented him from separating questions of entertainment, spectacle, and dramatic experience. His statements sound as if they applied to war rather than to a form of art and as if the prototype of all theater were the Roman Coliseum or a bull fight. After asserting that "climate" is necessary to laughter, that this climate depends on "lack of identification," that "the conjunction of the potentially funny with the potentially risible (that is, properly 'having the faculty of laughing') might be said to constitute

the climate of laughter," we are told that "laughter is that tenuous bond which aggression establishes this side of indifference." In the theater an experience occurs "whose singularity is derived from the fact that it is about man and performed by man." This experience is the "onset of man upon man" which finds "a logical arena in the theater." (Page 5.) Clearly the laughter with which we are dealing is not the *rire dans l'ame* of Molière and it is now not a little strange to hear Mr. Grossvogel refer to a "human element" which constitutes an inevitable limitation on the writer of comedy. If his comedy is to succeed, he must portray the "aberrations of recognizably human inferiors." The writer of tragedy, on the other hand, will not "attempt to imitate a physical surface," as does the writer of comedy. "He will instead call on the spectator to transfer the tragedy from the shallow dimensions of the stage into the full reality of his own being, relying for this absorption on the persuasive flesh of the actor, his presence and reality as a human agent, and hence as a mesmeric one, but never relying on the credibility of his incarnation." (Page 7.) And the author concludes: "Thus, whereas the tragedian will abandon the unreality of the stage for the reality of the spectator and will use the physical being of the actor only as suasion, the comic playwright will seek out the physical fact, the reality of the actor, and will strive to make of the character and stage a world real enough to feed anthropophagous laughter." (Page 8.)

The fact is that Mr. Grossvogel has fallen into the error described by Eric Bentley as *Theatricalism*: the doctrine that "drama is not primarily a form of poetry, a vision of life, an expression of the dramatist's nature, or anything comparable to other works of art, but a matter of theatrical technique in which the chief factor is the existence of an audience." (*In Search of Theater*, Vintage, page 14.) Indeed, in an attack on the "brooding critics" (T. S. Eliot, Gaëtan Picon, and others), who have "evoked a Golden Age of the theater," Mr. Grossvogel says: "Such assertions (myths of a Golden Age) cannot satisfy the theorist who believes that the spectator determines the ultimate fate of all things theatrical. . . ." (Page 9.) If one turns to one of the "brooding critics," Francis Fergusson, it becomes clear that it is Mr. Grossvogel who broods and not he. Writing of the same period, Mr. Fergusson takes into account social space and historical time, literary authorship, the "poetry" of the theater, specific theater movements and personalities. He commits himself to statements of value. But Mr. Grossvogel has no time to question

the assumptions of theater nor to see theater as a human enterprise of art in the world. Perhaps that is why he loses sight of his original purpose. Of self-consciousness in the modern French theater there is little question once the book gets under way. In France the theater is indeed an arena, not for the "onset of man upon man" nor for "anthropophagous laughter," but for the struggle for freedom and expression which is the province of art and which also involves the theater. It is a struggle for consciousness which occurs under rigorous conditions. It seemed logical to think that *The Self-Conscious Stage in Modern French Drama* would deal with these conditions. But I have doubtless read an intention into Mr. Grossvogel's title which was never there.

One last point must be mentioned, since it is very serious: the language in which this book is written is appalling.

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ORESTE F. PUCCIANI

Robert Champigny, *Stages on Sartre's Way* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1959. 199 pp. \$3.75. Indiana University Publications, Humanities Series, 42). JEAN-PAUL Sartre méprise la littérature; il en fait une servante des idées ou, pire encore, une servante de l'action. Combien de fois n'avons-nous pas entendu ces formules depuis dix ou quinze ans? Elles prennent, dans la bouche de certains critiques, une valeur d'exorcisme. Répétez-les en fermant les yeux et Jean-Paul Sartre aura disparu quand vous les rouvrirez.

Sartre trahit l'ineffable essence littéraire. Il déguise en person-nages des idées froides et rigides. La formule d'exorcisme est une oraison funèbre. Il est impertinent d'ajouter quoi que ce soit. N'allez pas demander, par exemple, *quelles idées* se cachent, ou plutôt ne réussissent pas à se cacher, derrière Mathieu, Daniel, Brunet, Goetz ou Nasty. Personne ne vous répondra. Les critiques littéraires s'entretiennent de technique romanesque et théâtrale, les philosophes ne sortent jamais de *L'Être et le néant*. Entre l'oeuvre philosophique et l'oeuvre littéraire personne, jusqu'ici, n'avait lancé le moindre pont.

Nous savons, depuis Stendhal, que les écrivains à soucis politiques "tirent des coups de pistolet au milieu d'un concert." C'est tout un arsenal, nous dit-on, que Sartre installe aux avant-scènes de son théâtre. Mais ceux-là mêmes qui se prétendent assourdis par la

canonnade sont incapables de préciser la stratégie de l'artilleur, le calibre de ses armes, la nature des explosifs ou même l'instant de la détonation. On nous affirme que la *thèse*, trop évidente, tue le mystère littéraire mais les thèses sartriennes demeurent souvent confidentielles. L'atmosphère d'adulation et d'hostilité maniaque qui enveloppait, hier encore, l'oeuvre de Sartre, était peu propice à un examen raisonnable. Le livre excellent de Robert Champigny semble annoncer un changement de saison. Il remplit la lacune que nous venons de signaler: "The object of this essay is not to offer a critical *exposé* of Sartre's philosophy but to analyze his most representative works, from 1938 to 1952 and to interpret them in the light of their philosophical background."

Robert Champigny a suivi son programme à la lettre et il s'est remarquablement acquitté d'une tâche infiniment plus complexe et délicate que n'affectent de la juger les contempteurs de la littérature sartrienne. Ceux-ci voudraient nous convaincre qu'il existe une symétrie parfaite et mécanique entre les deux oeuvres philosophique et littéraire. Il suffirait donc, à les en croire, de rapprocher les textes et de multiplier les références. Ces vues simplistes supposent que *L'Etre et le néant* est l'écriture sainte du sartrisme, la clef magique qui ouvre toutes les portes. En réalité *L'Etre et le néant* est un moment distinct, une étape chronologique dans l'évolution intellectuelle de Jean-Paul Sartre. Les textes littéraires qui précèdent et suivant le grand ouvrage philosophique ne lui sont pas parfaitement accordés. La distinction entre l'essai didactique et son illustration littéraire est d'ailleurs artificielle. Les critiques littéraires qui reprochent à Sartre de subordonner l'oeuvre littéraire à la philosophie ne se rendent pas compte, apparemment, que les philosophes font à Sartre un reproche inverse et l'accusent d'être beaucoup trop littéraire.

Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner si le chapitre de Robert Champigny sur *L'Etre et le néant* est le plus *littéraire* de toute son étude. Champigny n'hésite pas à appliquer à la pensée de Sartre la méthode de critique poétique élaborée par Gaston Bachelard. Il dégage les images élémentaires qui sous-tendent le système sartrien. Une telle entreprise ne va pas, assurément, sans arrières-pensées "subversives." Sartre accuse l'écrivain "dégagé" d'être un philosophe sans le savoir. Sartre se veut philosophe en le sachant. Mais Champigny découvre, derrière ce philosophe hyperconscient, un poète qui s'ignore. Si le but secret de l'engagement est la conscience absolue dans l'oeuvre

d'art, la maîtrise totale de l'écrivain sur sa propre oeuvre, ce but demeure inaccessible.

Les analyses de Champigny montrent la vanité des querelles soulevées par la notion d'engagement. On fait la moue devant une oeuvre qui sacrifie l'esthétique à l'éthique. On ne se rend pas compte qu'en s'élevant contre le souci sartrien d'efficacité on accepte de combattre sur le terrain choisi par l'écrivain. On abandonne à Jean-Paul Sartre tout ce qu'il réclame de ses critiques. On reconnaît implicitement que l'oeuvre est bien telle que son auteur l'a choisie. Or l'oeuvre de Sartre est tout ce que l'on voudra mais elle n'est pas efficace. Elle est parfaitement incapable de répandre les idées sartriennes parmi les lecteurs non avertis. Sartre reproche à tous les écrivains français de ne pas s'adresser aux masses. Mais cette malédiction lui retombe sur la tête. Son vrai public est plus limité encore que celui de ses prédécesseurs, et il n'est pas moins bourgeois. Si Sartre atteint les masses c'est toujours grâce à quelque malentendu et dans un climat de mésintelligence typiquement romantique.

Les détracteurs, plus encore que les disciples de Sartre, nous ont caché cet échec de la littérature engagée. Pour se débarrasser d'un écrivain qu'ils trouvent opaque, obscur et même incompréhensible ils lui reprochent d'être simpliste et grossièrement clair. Ils se réclament de l'ineffable mystère littéraire parce qu'ils s'effraient, au fond d'eux-mêmes, du mystère que leur propose le grand-prêtre existentialiste. N'osant pas crier que l'empereur est nu ils lui reprochent avec sévérité de porter un habit trop voyant.

Ces malentendus empilés les uns sur les autres sont caractéristiques de la légèreté contemporaine. Ne doutons pas que Jean-Paul Sartre lui-même prenne un plaisir un peu morbide à manoeuvrer vers les retranchements de l'art pour l'art et de la pure essence littéraire des gens que la seule mention de Mallarmé ou de Valéry ferait rebondir dans le camps opposé.

L'ouvrage de Robert Champigny révèle pleinement un échec que le *Jean-Paul Sartre par lui-même* de Francis Jeanson suggérait déjà. "Jean-Paul Sartre, écrit Champigny, has been reproached for stuffing his plays and novels with his philosophy. It seems to us, on the contrary, that there is a gap between the essays on the one hand and the plays and novels on the other. This gap allows the plays and novels an autonomy which is commendable from a literary point of view. But it also permits the purpose of the author to pass unnoticed or to be misinterpreted."

Sartre ne se fait plus d'illusion, nous affirme Champigny, sur l'efficacité de son oeuvre littéraire. Mais Sartre attribue son impuissance à la conjoncture historique et sociale, c'est-à-dire, en dernier ressort au lecteur. La conjoncture est déplorable, nul ne songe à le nier, mais on peut lire aussi, au fond de l'engagement le plus frénétique, une obscure volonté d'échec. Après avoir lu l'ouvrage de Champigny on est plus tenté que jamais de retourner contre Sartre l'arme traîtresse de la "psychanalyse existentielle." L'oeuvre sartrienne est un piège que l'écrivain tend à la mauvaise foi du lecteur. Mais cette mauvaise foi se dérobe et sort indemne de l'épreuve. Le lecteur renvoie à l'auteur le miroir que celui-ci lui présente. Ce n'est pas mon image mais celle de l'auteur que je découvre dans l'oeuvre. Ce malentendu, n'est pas neuf, c'est le vieux malentendu romantique, celui des *Fleurs du Mal*, celui de *Mme Bovary*, celui de tous les grands "scandales" littéraires qui se succèdent—monotonement—depuis un siècle et demi. L'incompréhension du public rejette Jean-Paul Sartre dans une solitude clairvoyante qui ne diffère pas beaucoup des autres solitudes romantiques. Le martyr de l'engagement finit, lui aussi, dans son nid d'aigle et cet asile est d'autant plus inexpugnable que l'écrivain a rejeté les mythes de l'individualisme romantique et qu'il a tout fait, en apparence, pour se mêler à la foule.

On voit les prolongements que suggèrent les analyses de Champigny. Mais le critique a trop à faire pour se lancer, comme nous, dans la voie des spéculations hasardeuses. Il se met au service de l'oeuvre; il supplée aux déficiences de l'engagement. Il suit les textes pas à pas et nous révèle les intentions manquées de l'écrivain. Les exégèses de Champigny sont passionnantes car elles se situent toujours dans une zone où les évidences, sans êtres trop immédiates, sont toujours accessibles. Nous parvenons à cette évidence au terme d'une gymnastique intellectuelle tonifiante mais jamais lassante. Robert Champigny possède toutes les qualités que réclame une entreprise de cette nature: une formation philosophique poussée, une intuition critique aigüe, une connaissance très intime de l'oeuvre critiquée. Ces qualités lui permettent de mener à bien un travail qui n'a jamais été plus nécessaire qu'aujourd'hui et jamais, peut-être, n'a été plus négligé. Son étude mérite le plus grand compliment qu'on puisse faire à un critique: elle facilite la compréhension et l'appréciation d'une oeuvre littéraire.

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RENÉ GIRARD

Walter Johannes Schröder, *Das Nibelungenlied. Versuch einer Deutung* (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954. 94 pp.). THE essay, a reprint from vol. 76 (1954) of the *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, does not concern itself, except marginally, with the genesis of the epic, its sources, and preceding stages of development: problems which are still very much under discussion. The author offers an interpretation of the poem arising from answers to questions of his own which are neither as obvious as inquiries into the origins of the NL nor perhaps entirely necessary: Why did a poet around 1200 take the trouble to compose such an enormous work as the NL, why was it so well received in courtly circles, and what is the meaning of the NL? The answer: that the poem, apart from other considerations, is more than sufficiently heroic, and courtly enough, to have appealed to a medieval public (and evidently sufficiently interesting and agelessly human, or inhuman, for audiences of *any* period), seems to be too simple an answer to even be mentioned. The question requires deeper probing, a *Deutung*, which can perhaps be summarized by means of a few quotations: "Die Sage erfasst diese Verhältnisse [conditions in the Merovingian kingdom of the 6th/7th centuries] mit der Konzeption des schwachen Fürsten, der vom Ratgeber (Hagen) und Helfer (Siegfried) abhängig ist und schliesslich durch Familienzwistigkeiten (Gunther-Kriemhild) mit seinem ganzen Hause untergeht" (p. 55). "Der Dichter des NL (oder sein Vorgänger) dichtete in seinem ersten Teil eine Sagenquelle aus, die als Inhalt den unfähigen Herrscher hatte, der, auf Ratgeber und Helfer angewiesen, sich auf Rat des ersteren des letzteren bedient und ihn dann, da er zu Ansehen kommt, beseitigen lässt. Es bedurfte nur der Interpretation unfähig gleich höfisch, um dem Sagenproblem seine für 1200 zeitgemässe Füllung und damit wieder seine Aktualität zu geben" (p. 56). "Das 'Urlied' deutet den geschichtlichen Realbefund durch Gegenüberstellung zweier Seiten, einer alten und der Gegenwart. Diese Deutung übernimmt das NL. Seine Neuerung besteht vor allem darin, dass es das Bild der Gegenwart aus der eigenen Zeit nimmt. Damit erscheinen die vielbesprochenen 'Schichten' des NLs in einem ganz neuen Lichte. Sie gehören bereits den ältesten Quellen an und sind das Mittel, den realgeschichtlichen Tatsachenbestand deutend zu erhellen" (p. 57). "So kann die Erhellung der Gegenwart nicht besser geschehen als durch die Erzählung von Urzeitgeschichten" (p. 61). And so it goes. This reviewer feels that he is not alone in his disagreement with the view that the poet

of the NL is a philosophizing historian who has assigned himself the task of "sich und seinem Publikum die geschichtlichen Ereignisse mit Hilfe einfacher menschlicher Verhältnisse und Beziehungen verständlich zu machen" (p. 52).

He who disagrees with the thesis will equally naturally object to the argumentation. "Es hat doch offenbar den Anschein, als ob der Dichter die Handlung in zwei verschiedenen historischen Zeiten verlaufen lassen wolle" (p. 23); this is by no means evident. Another example may suffice: Could the fall of the Burgundians, asks the author, have been prevented if they had followed Hagen's warning not to accept Etzel's invitation? The answer is 'no': "die Katastrophe wäre ebenfalls eingetreten, freilich auf andere Weise. Denn da Siegfried tot ist, fehlt den Wormsern die Kraft, durch die sie sich bisher behauptet haben" (p. 49). This is idle and erroneous speculation.

The essay concludes with a very readable and stimulating chapter on the relationship between the heroic and courtly epic, exemplified by the NL and Wolfram's *Parzival*, and an interpretation of *Die Klage*. This chapter is quite independent, and to some extent unrelated to Chapter I, but it somehow compensates for the irritation caused by the latter. Not to the point, however, of generating a pardoning mood for what is wanting in the main and obviously more important part of the essay.

Harvard University

GERARD F. SCHMIDT

Maria Bindschedler, *Gottfried von Strassburg und die höfische Ethik* (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1955. 42 pp.). THE essay is a reprint, now augmented by a two-page preface, of an article which appeared in vol. 76 (1954) of the *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* (Halle). It is an interesting and worthwhile attempt at a new interpretation of the *Grundauffassung* of Gottfried's *Tristan*, and at the same time a justified revision of other interpretations; it is short, but admirably clear, and the author's arguments are well supported by textual evidence from Gottfried's work as well as from other medieval writers. While presenting her own views toward a solution—if solution there can be—of this most important *Tristan* problem, the author cannot, and does not wish to,

ignore or bypass the opinions of other *Tristan* scholars (Weber, Schwietering, Maurer, Mergell, and others). She is far from ignoring them; in fact, her disagreement with others actually seems to have prompted this essay. Its polemic portion is therefore considerable. In the presence of quite a few conflicting and weighty views on an important issue, criticism, even polemical criticism, is not only unavoidable, it is necessary and desirable. Since most of the author's critical remarks are confined to copious footnotes, while her own views, i. e., her new interpretation, are expressed in the body of the text, the readability of the whole suffers somewhat. This is a pity, for the controversial subject-matter is important, and the author has much to contribute toward a clarification of the issue. This reviewer feels, therefore, that the author owes it to herself, to her "adversaries," and to the public at large to expand her essay into a well-integrated book in which, while constructing her own edifice, she would modify other structures on a much larger scale and in a more detailed way.

Harvard University

GERARD F. SCHMIDT

William F. Mainland, *Schiller and the Changing Past* (London: Heinemann, and Fairlawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1957. xii + 207 pp.). PRAISED for its originality by both its publisher and the *London Times Book Review*, Mr. Mainland's book will disappoint those who seek tenable new interpretations in all or even the majority of the book's seven chapters. While frequently stimulating and occasionally original, the book is also at times forced in its argumentation and highly speculative in its conclusions. In addition, it fails to redeem the reviewer's (and in essence the author's) claim that "there is an inner coherence about the whole." The last chapter, by far the most important in the book, thematically transcends the earlier ones, while discussions of *Don Carlos* and *Die Braut von Messina*, which by the author's own admission would have strengthened his thesis (implicit in the book's title), are left out.

The first chapter, an examination of *Fiesco*, penetrates deeply into the character of the young Schiller; it also pursues—often brilliantly—the motif of masques, masquerades, and dissemblment. By comparison the main point of the chapter is pedestrian. Taking the three versions of the final scene as his point of departure, Mr. Mainland

argues that the play's different solutions, puzzles, and inconsistencies are attributable to the vacillating attitude of the youthful poet. As a result *Fiesco* became "not an artistic composition, but the record of an experiment in progress." Mr. Mainland elaborately defends this unfavorable estimate (p. 16); in my opinion, unnecessarily so. For many previous studies, such as Calvin Thomas' venerable *The Life and Works of Friedrich Schiller* (New York, 1901) reach substantially the same conclusion.

The second essay, "*Wallensteins Tod*, Life's Ambiguity; Observations on a Stage Direction" addresses itself to a single question: Does the drama contain sufficient evidence that Wallenstein "deceived Buttler by advising the court in Vienna not to confer upon him the title of Count?" Mr. Mainland examines all the pertinent evidence and finds it wanting. "Buttler is convinced that the letter Octavio hands Buttler is authentic; but *we* are not." He further argues that line 1448 (Wallenstein: So hab ich . . . dem Buttler stilles Unrecht abzubitten) need not refer to Wallenstein's duplicity. "But 'abbitten' and 'stilles Unrecht' are unlikely words for a man to use in reference to such a grievous wrong."

Then Mr. Mainland examines Goethe's review of the drama which but for the appraisal of the various performances was written in collaboration with Schiller. Goethe had written: "Ihn [Buttler] überführt Oktavio Piccolomini durch Vorzeigen authentischer Dokumente, daß Wallenstein selbst der Urheber jener Beschimpfung gewesen. . . ." For several reasons Mr. Mainland also considers this review as inconclusive evidence: Goethe commits "a remarkable inaccuracy" by referring to a single letter as "Dokumente" in the plural; Schiller, in approving the review, might have felt that it presented "an adequate description of the incident, not as seen by the playwright or by an impartial observer but by the two participants in the scene [Octavio and Buttler];" finally Goethe and Schiller, since they hastily wrote the review as refutation to Böttiger's erroneous interpretation, were perhaps forced by didactic needs to be more explicit than a strict reading of the text itself would warrant. After also discrediting the argument of some scholars that Octavio might be the culprit in the affair of the letter, Mr. Mainland concludes that Schiller has left the question "Who wrote the letter which alienated Buttler" unanswered.

If Mr. Mainland's reasoning is correct, we must conclude that Schiller, one of the great masters of the theater, has violated a near-

axiom of stagecraft and that Goethe is guilty of obscurantism as a reviewer. In classical theater the audience can safely accept the word of a character for unseen events or unseeable details, if the character is acting in good faith and if his testimony is not refuted elsewhere. Buttler's affirmation of the letter's authenticity fulfills all these conditions. Also Mr. Mainland's citation of examples of other bogus documents in Schiller's plays (e. g., in *Die Räuber*, *Kabale und Liebe*, *Don Carlos*, and *Maria Stuart*) do not buttress but undermine his contention. In his chapter on *Maria Stuart* Mr. Mainland looks for and finds (debatable) evidence later in the drama for his argument that despite Maria's denial the "Babbington plot letters" may not be forgeries; in the other three plays Schiller's characters deceive each other, but the author here too plays scrupulously fair with his audience. Furthermore, in Mr. Mainland's interpretation Wallenstein's repentance vis-à-vis Buttler lacks motivation. And I would contend that the words "stilles Unrecht," Wallenstein's characterisation of his deed, are by no means a mild inculpation, but in a person as unrepentant as Wallenstein an almost extravagant declaration of *mea culpa*.

Goethe's review, though it contains that minute mistake, appears to me totally unambiguous. Mr. Mainland seems to argue on the one hand that the review is overly explicit; on the other that its obvious meaning is not the true one. The two arguments would seem to cancel each other. Towards the end of the chapter we find the philosophical conclusion to the author's premise: "It was possibly his intention to leave us in doubt. Such intention would assort very well with the central theme of the play—the 'Doppelsinn des Lebens.'" I think Schiller's friend Körner was closer to the truth when he (in a letter to the poet dated 9 April 1799) offered a far less abstract explanation for Schiller's rather cursory treatment of the letter episode: "Auch durfte . . . [Wallensteins Beleidigung von Buttler] im 2. Theile nicht sehr erwähnt werden, weil da Wallensteins Bild keinen solchen Schatten verträgt."

In his chapter on *Maria Stuart*, among the most successful in the book, Mr. Mainland writes a *Rettung* of both Schiller and Elisabeth. "The bickering about fact and fiction is tedious and myopic," the author argues. Then he shows that in *Maria Stuart*, where "two opposing modes of life—the traditional and the experimental—" vie with each other, Elisabeth is saddled with tasks more difficult, complex, and more likely to invite tragedy than are those of her rival. She must live by the Machiavellian dictum that appearances rather

than actuality are important. "The tragedy of Elisabeth is . . . heightened by the transference of the Machiavellian lesson to an inept and even unwilling pupil, in circumstances by no means entirely favorable." Mr. Mainland's contention that Machiavelli's tenets are also the theme of *Der Geisterseher* and his argument that Maria's guilt is more complex and encompassing than her complicity in Darnley's murder add farther interesting if controversial observations to this stimulating chapter.

A daring comparison between Elisabeth and Johanna—which never becomes strained—introduces and accompanies the chapter on *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*. It also leads logically to Mr. Mainland's chief observation about this drama: In the problem of Johanna and her father "we may see the focus of the social tragedy and of the social redemption, [as] the vivid illustration of a larger problem—her relationship to all her environment." Beyond making a strong case for this contention Mr. Mainland has filled this essay with enlightening apperçus. Commenting on Johanna's sudden awareness of mundane objects and details, he says: "She sees, but her vision has passed." Or, in a sentence which has relevancy to all of Schiller's plays, he observes: "The total play is different from the sum of its episodes."

The essay "*Wilhelm Tell*; the Individual and the General Will," whose sub-title describes its focal point, covers much the same ground as an earlier article, Hermann Barnstorff's brief, excellent "Individualism and Collectivism in Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell* (*Monatshefte*, XLV, 166-170). In fact, here and throughout his book Mr. Mainland consistently ignores American Schiller research; his selected three-page bibliography does not contain a single item published in the U. S. and his only quotation from an American book (Warren and Wellek's *Theory of Literature*) cites the British edition.

In a brief, almost overly concise chapter the author examines the meaning of the fragment *Demetrius*: "Demetrius was to be the individual in whom hereditary authority is suddenly declared an illusion, but in whom the power that has been absorbed must also be defended. In this one man are both the old belief in hereditary right and the force of the new credentials. The incoherent revolutionary Fiesco is supplanted by Demetrius, the 'problematic nature' of the post-Revolutionary years." Although Mr. Mainland's arguments would have benefited from a lengthier treatment (for example, the comparison to Shakespeare's usurpers should have included not only Macbeth, but also Richard III), he succeeds in showing—if not in

discovering—how world events shaped and molded Schiller's attitude toward the political problem in *Demetrius*.

The last essay, a profound discussion of *Naive and sentimentalische Dichtung*, intends to discover "how Schiller in the midst of imposing contrasts offers us, sometimes through some name or inconspicuous phrase, a glimpse of union beyond discord." During his remarkable search Mr. Mainland finds, for example, that Schiller envisions a ultimate union between the two contrasting types of poetry, "musikalische und plastische Dichtung." In making his point, Mr. Mainland displays remarkable scope. Analyses of Matthiesson's poetry, Schiller's attitude to Goethe, Wieland, and Kant, his theory of music, comparisons to pertinent works by E. T. A. Hoffmann and C. F. Mayer—they all are used to substantiate the essay's central contention. Even at its most controversial (is a poem as an artefact really "a thing heard?"), this essay adds greatly to our understanding of Schiller's "most intense essay." It is a cause for regret that Mr. Mainland's book only occasionally scales the heights of its last chapter.

Denison University

GUY STERN

Hans M. Wolff, *Thomas Mann, Werk und Bekenntnis* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1957. 143 pp.). THIS "kleine Studie" is concerned with the ultimate significance of Thomas Mann's work. It is defined as the recognition "daß auch der Nihilist, der Mensch, der die Sinnlosigkeit eines dem Leide verhafteten Lebens erfäßt, nicht zu verzweifeln braucht. . . . Wer es vermag, dem Leben ironisch zu begegnen, lächelnd, ohne Bitterkeit, der überwindet den Nihilismus und wird des Wunders der wiedergewonnenen Unbefangenheit teilhaftig, von dem vor allem Manns letzte Werke. . . . Zeugnis ablegen" (pp. 142-43). The attempt at substantiation involves some twenty of the shorter narratives and the novels. Of the essays only two are cursorily examined (*Friedrich* and *Betrachtungen*, pp. 53-55); the pamphlets and radio addresses are merely mentioned.

There is no denying that irony may take the sting out of nothingness. However, nihilism is not only the individual's concern, it is also a political reality. Confronting it, Mann knew at once that irony was an inefficacious weapon. In his major essays, he helped guard the imperiled cultural heritage and keep it alive; in the pamphlets

and addresses he became embattled, "von ganzer Seele Rufer im Streit" ("Sechzehn Jahre").

Clearly, Mr. Wolff is aware of the ironically smiling novelist and the grimly engaged humanist as well. He chose to limit the discussion because, it seems, he did not want to become politically embroiled. Whatever the reason, the limitation is severe because Mann's non-fiction is an integral part of the "Werk" and most revealing as "Bekenntnis."

University of Colorado

GERHARD LOOSE

Eugenio Coseriu, *Sincronía, diacronía e historia* (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 1958. 164 pp.). THIS book is not intended to set forth a theory of linguistic change, as the author points out on a flyleaf, but to present an explanation of how linguistic change ought to be regarded. As in the case of most of us, many of the author's ideas have been garnered from his predecessors, and he cites these sources appropriately; the originality of the work consists mainly in the way in which these ideas have been put together and in the placing of the emphasis. This reviewer agrees heartily with some of the author's points of view, but a few of them—unfortunately basic—he cannot accept. The book is divided into seven chapters, each of which deals with several fundamental topics, but among the chapters there is a great deal of overlapping and repetition, and their titles are much too long to cite here.

In any sustained attempt to define, or redefine, terms and concepts—which is what this book largely purports to offer—we can expect a certain amount of exaggeration of the differences in the points of view between the author and those he undertakes to criticize, but here the exaggeration is sometimes carried to the point of unfairness. Here and there it is conceded that the differences may, after all, be merely a matter of terminology, but then the author proceeds again as if this point had not occurred to him. A number of authors are cited and interpreted to the effect that "the normal thing, the thing that one would expect, would be that languages would not change," and that linguistic change must be due to "external causes" (pp. 7-8). It is pointed out that the supposed anomaly of linguistic change results from the erroneous identification, either explicit or implicit, of lan-

guage with synchronic projection. The antinomy *synchrony-diachrony*, we are reminded, as we should be often, pertains to linguistics, not to language. The error of not being aware of this is ascribed to De Saussure and his followers (the school specializing in synchrony) and to the Prague School and its followers (the diachronic structuralists), but much farther on (p. 119) it is admitted that the latter have abandoned a strictly static conception of language and regard it as dynamic.

The author's conception of language, with which the reviewer heartily agrees, is such that he feels obliged to reject "causal" explanations of change. Basing himself on Von Humboldt's credo that language is not *ergon* but *energeia* (p. 25), he states that language changes "precisely because it is not a thing made [*no está hecha*] but is being made [*se hace*] continually by linguistic activity: because it exists as a technique and modality of speaking" (p. 39). He aptly expresses this idea in other ways: "the development of language is not a perpetual 'changing,' arbitrary and haphazard, but a perpetual systematization" (p. 154); "language is not a mere form, nor a form organized *between* two substances, but an *organizing* form" (p. 152, n. 91; this expresses Coseriu's fundamental objection to Glossematics). Hence, he says, we should not speak of the general problem of linguistic change in causal terms, these terms being "a residuum of the old conception of languages as natural organisms and attempts to make linguistics a science of 'laws' like the physical sciences" (p. 102), but we should treat it as a *conditional* problem and look for the *conditions* in which linguistic changes occur (p. 37). Throughout the book the "causal" approach is vehemently proscribed, although it is admitted that this may be, at least in part, a mere matter of terminology (p. 102). The diachronic structuralists, we are told (p. 125), because of methodological requirements and their naturalistic tradition, usually start with a system in equilibrium rather than one in motion; "therefore various structuralists need a *deus ex machina*, an 'external cause,' to begin the movement itself" (in a footnote A. Martinet is mentioned as an exception). Perhaps this criticism is aimed at some early treatises of the Prague School. Contemporary diachronic structuralists, for purely methodological reasons, operate with synchronic systems, but they do not regard them as in equilibrium, and they do not seek any kind of *deus ex machina*. Their terminology may well be at fault here, for some of them have grouped the factors of sound change as "internal" and "external." These

ambiguous terms can be discarded if those same factors are grouped, instead, as "universal and permanent" (expressivity, economy, and the functional asymmetry of the speech organs) and "sporadic and temporary" (contact between languages and other factors due to sociological and historical circumstances).

It evidently has not occurred to the author that, since phonology is purely distinctive and directly connected with mechanical activity, and grammar and lexicon are significative, as well as distinctive, and not connected directly with articulatory mechanics, there must be some fundamental differences between the processes and factors involved in the changes of the one and of the others. He states that linguistic change "always suits an *expressive necessity*; a necessity that may be cultural, social, esthetic, or functional" (p. 49; see also pp. 109, 114, and *passim*). In phonology, except in the case of voluntary and conscious imitation, *expressive necessity* determines only the conservation of existing distinctions; the new articulations involved in phonemic shifts and in mergers of phonemes are determined by economy in connection with the mechanical possibilities of the speech organs. But Coseriu rejects the concept of a permanent and universal tension between expressivity (or communicativeness) and economy: "... in creative intellectual activities no such tendency is attested" (p. 115, n. 42). Now, in the first place, the normal distinctive function of the phonemic stock of a language, since it is not significative, has nothing to do with creative intellectual activity, except in voluntary imitation; and, in the second place, there is a whole world of evidence of economy in all human behavior, including the creative and intellectual.

Concerning the process of linguistic change, some of the author's ideas are exceptionable. He denies (pp. 82-83) the existence of any gradual changes, even in phonology, *e. g.*, the gradual unvoicing of voiced consonants; and he states that such changes are never attested! Evidently he rejects the very logical postulate of the diachronic structuralists, namely, that there is a range of dispersion in the articulation of all phonemes of *all* speakers and, in the case of most phonemic shifts, a gradual and *not consciously* noticed shift of the range of dispersion and, hence, of the norm. It is objected that the frequently postulated "imperceptible changes" cannot possibly be conserved and added to one another. Perhaps one should be more careful in the choice of words and speak of "gradual and not consciously noticed (but still perceived) changes." The author also states emphatically

that the idea "that speaking is an 'unconscious' activity or that speakers 'are not conscious' of the norms of the language that they speak . . . is an unfortunate and contradictory idea, which ought to be abandoned" (p. 32). To this it must be replied that most ordinary speech, especially on the phonological plane, is indeed an unconscious activity, and that we use the norms of our language, which we know very well, without being conscious of them; there is nothing contradictory about knowledge and the unconscious use of that knowledge.

We must certainly agree with the author that "the problem of a given change is always a historical problem," since he includes in "history" both systematic, or structural, and extra-systematic conditions (p. 81). Surely structural factors should be considered along with socio-historical factors to the extent that data concerning the latter are available.

Even if a reader were unable to agree with any of the principal views set forth in this book, he would certainly be impressed with the desirability of exercising extreme caution in his choice of terminology in discussing language and its changes.

Columbia University

FREDRICK JUNGEMANN

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